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The Law of Friction
William McGeverant

INTRODUCTION

To physicists and mechanical engineers, friction is a
fundamental force of nature that resists motion between two
surfaces where they touch.' The laws of friction describe the
behavior of this force. To many in Silicon Valley, however, the
word "friction" has another meaning: it describes the forces that
impede individuals from disclosing personal information when
they use online services, particularly social networks such as
Facebook. As more businesses turn to social media as a source of
promotion and eventually revenue, this kind of friction
represents lost opportunity. As a result, "frictionless sharing"
became an extremely trendy idea in 2011, heralded by many as
the wave of the future. 2 The law has little to say about online
friction, but it represents an important force governing flows of
personal information.
A platform based on frictionless sharing discloses
individuals' activities automatically, rather than waiting for
them to authorize a particular disclosure. For example,
t Associate Professor and Lampert Fesler Research Fellow, University of Minnesota
Law School; Resident Fellow, University of Minnesota Institute for Advanced Study. In
addition to my participation at this Symposium, I also benefited from presentations of
earlier drafts at the 2012 Privacy Law Scholars Conference hosted at George
Washington University Law School and a faculty workshop at the University of
Minnesota Law School. I am particularly grateful to Danielle Citron, Tom Cotter, Eric
Goldman, James Grimmelmann, Todd Henderson, Chris Hoofnagle, Michael Madison,
Paul Ohm, Ruth Okediji, Randy Picker, Jules Polonetsky, Neil Richards, Ira Rubinstein,
Lior Strahilevitz, Kathy Strandburg, and Felix Wu for their thoughts and to Will Hahn
for research assistance.
See Herbert S. Cheng, Friction, in Rita G. Lerner and George L. Trigg, eds, 1
Encyclopedia of Physics 352 (Wiley-VCH 3d ed 2005); Kimberly A. McGrath, Friction, in
Kimberly A. McGrath, ed, World of Physics 265 (Gale 2001).
2
See, for example, Matthew Ingram, Why Facebook's Frictionless Sharing is the
Future, Bloomberg Businessweek Technology (Bloomberg Oct 3, 2011), online at
http:I/www.businessweek.com/technology/why-facebooks-frictionless-sharing-is-thefuture-10032011.html (visited Sept 15, 2013); Alicia Eler, Top Trends of 2011:
Frictionless Sharing, (Readwrite Dec 14, 2011), online at http://readwrite.coml
2011/12/14/top-trendsof_2011_frictionless sharing (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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mainstream news websites, including the Washington Post, offer
"social reading" applications ("apps") in Facebook. 3 After a onetime authorization, these apps send routine messages through
Facebook to users' friends identifying articles the users view. 4
Everyone in Facebook has seen such notifications in the news
feed or ticker, sometimes aggregated and placed with extra
prominence. 5 Similarly, by default the music streaming service
Spotify notifies Facebook friends of the songs a user hears,6
while Quora, a question-and-answer forum, has adopted several
frictionless notification features that routinely publicize activity
on the site.7
Netflix, increasingly a video streaming company rather
than a DVD rental service, also wanted to adopt frictionless
sharing. It introduced such a feature in several countries, but
had refrained from doing so in the United States because it
believed a rather obscure federal statute called the Video
Privacy Protection Act (VPPA)8 might prohibit it from doing so.9
3 See Washington Post Social Reader (The Washington Post), online at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/2010/07/08/gIQA2eKpnK-page.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Newer participants include the popular online magazines Slate and The Huffington Post.
See Introducing Social Reading (Slate Aug 21, 2012), online at http://www.
slate.com/articles/briefing/slate-fare/2012/08/socialreadingon-slate-a-great-new-way
for-you-and-your-facebook friends to-share-your_favorite articles .html (visited Sept
15, 2013) (providing a social reading application similar to The Washington Post's Social
Reader); Elena Haliczer, Arianna Huffington, and Sam Napolitano, Huff Post Launches
Social Reader App for Facebook Timeline, The Huffington Post Technology Blog
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.
online
16,
2012),
Feb
Post
(Huffington
com/elena-haliczer/huffpost-launches-social- b 1282524.html (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(same).
4 In February 2012, Facebook announced that another dozen media outlets were
unveiling similar social reading apps. See Justin Osofsky, The Latest Wave of Media
Apps to Add to Timeline, Facebook + Media (Facebook Feb 16, 2012), online at
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-medialthe-latest-wave-of-media-apps-to-addto-timeline/328535253848637 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
5 See Lauren Indvik, Facebook Tests Smaller Version of "Trending Articles" in
Newsfeed (Mashable Apr 26, 2012), online at http://mashable.com/2012/04/26/facebooktrending-articles-test/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) (describing experimental changes in
Facebook's display of such stories on its site).
6 See Spotify, Spotify Privacy Policy *4.2 (Feb 19, 2013), online at http://www.
spotify.com/us/legal/privacy-policy/#share-information (visited Sept 15, 2013).
See Edmond Lau, Add Quora to Your Facebook Timeline, The Quora Blog (Quora
May 10, 2012) online at http://www.quora.com/blog/Add-Quora-to-Your-FacebookTimeline (visited Sept 15, 2013).
8 The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA), Pub L No 100-618, 102 Stat
3195 (1988), codified at 18 USC § 2710.
9 See Michael Drobac, Help Us Bring Facebook Sharing to Netflix USA, Netflix US
& Canada Blog (Netflix Sept 22, 2011), online at http://blog.netflix.com/2011109/help-usbring-facebook-sharing-to.html (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("[A] 1980's law creates some
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Eventually, as explained further below, Netflix persuaded
Congress to amend the VPPA, allowing the company to emulate
Spotify's embrace of frictionless sharing with a new "Netflix
Social" feature, unveiled in the United States in March 2013.10
In fact, however, the original VPPA prohibited only one possible
design (the most extreme one) for transmitting video viewing
information from Netflix to social networks." Nevertheless,
because the original VPPA required separate customer approval
for disclosure of each individual movie watched, 12 it interposed
more friction in Netflix than in Spotify.
This Article carefully analyzes the benefits and drawbacks
of frictionless sharing. Social media confers considerable
advantages on individuals, their friends, and, of course,
intermediaries like Spotify and Facebook. But many
implementations of frictionless architecture have gone too far,
potentially invading privacy and drowning useful information in
a tide of meaningless spam. The Article also considers the role of
regulation and asks: what should the law of friction be? Part I
provides brief background on frictionless sharing and describes
the VPPA and Netflix's successful campaign to alter it, which
then serves as a case study for the remainder of the analysis.
Part II documents significant benefits of social media for those
who disclose information, those who receive it, and businesses
that rely on it. Part III turns to concerns about frictionless
sharing, focusing both on threats to individual privacy and the
likely erosion of information quality and the recommendation
ecosystem.
Part IV ties this together by dissecting the rhetoric of
frictionless sharing and comparing it to reality. I have argued
confusion over our ability to let U.S. members automatically share the television shows
and movies they watch with their friends on Facebook."). The Video Privacy Protection
Act in the 21st Century, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and
the Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary *3 (Senate Judiciary Committee Jan
31, 2012) (including written testimony of David Hyman, General Counsel of Netflix, Inc),
online at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-1-3lHymanTestimony.pdf (visited Sept
15, 2013) ("Hyman Testimony").
10 Cameron Johnston, Introducing Netflix Social, Netflix US & Canada Blog
(Netflix Mar 13, 2013), online at http://blog.netflix.com/2013/03/introducing-netflixsocial.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
" See Part I.
12 See 18 USC § 2710(b)(2) (2012), prior to amendment by Pub L 112-258 (allowing
a video tape service provider to disclose personally identifiable information "with the
informed, written consent of the consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought")
(emphasis added).
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previously that endorsements or recommendations in social
media should be the result of "genuine consent." 13 Similarly,
because sharing is a volitional act, "frictionless sharing" is a
contradiction in terms. 1 4 In the physical world, too much friction
can impede movement or even start fires, but too little would
cause objects to slide off tables and cars off roads. The key to
online disclosures also turns out to be the correct amount of
friction, not its elimination.
Finally, Part V sums up the cost-benefit and rhetorical
analyses and considers the appropriate response. This Part
shows how a sharing system with too little individualized
control quickly reduces the net benefit to each consumer and to
society at large, but remains at least temporarily advantageous
for intermediaries such as Facebook and Netflix. It then turns to
determining the proper calibration. Mechanical engineers
constantly rely on the laws of friction, which can be reduced to
mathematical expression. We lawyers usually must make our
laws less precise. But a consumer protection agency such as the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could rely on a simple and
pragmatic principle of interface design that emerges from this
analysis and that balances the benefits and concerns about
automatic disclosures in social media.
Part V proposes this general law of online friction to guide
regulators: it should not be easier to "share" an action online
than to do it. Netflix could comply with this law of friction (and,
not coincidentally, with the original VPPA as well) through a
small design change. In particular, Netflix could simply put a
"PLAY AND SHARE" button next to the "PLAY' button that
viewers already must click to stream any video. An interface
would not satisfy this law of friction if it required more effort for
customers to start viewing a movie than to inform all their
Facebook friends what they are watching. Certain platforms,
notably Facebook, have perceived the problems with frictionless

13 William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing,
2009 U Ill L Rev 1105, 1158-62.
" See Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 Georgetown L J 689,
713-15 (2013). Despite these flaws, the terminology is unavoidable so I will use both
"friction" and "sharing" in this paper, though at times I mock both terms. As discussed
further below and especially in Part IV, frictionless sharing is not frictionless because it
merely shifts the default-the friction-so that users must take action to avoid
disclosing information. It is not sharing because true sharing is inherently active, not
passive.
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sharing and have begun to adhere more closely to this simple
design principle.' 5 Despite these improvements, many interfaces
- including the new Netflix Social - still fail to comply with the
law of friction.16 By consistently promoting the law of friction to
all social media purveyors-and threatening regulatory action if
they do not conform to it-agencies like the FTC can protect
consumers and maximize the benefits of authentic sharing based
on genuine consent.
I. FRICTIONLESS SHARING, NETFLIX, AND THE VPPA
A.

The Architecture of Frictionless Sharing

Spotify, the popular music streaming service, exemplifies
the move toward frictionless sharing. People who download the
Spotify app to their computers or smartphones can play, on
demand, any of millions of tracks.' 7 But the company does not
stop at individual enjoyment; by default, the platform publishes
the songs people play and the playlists they create, both within
the Spotify app and in Facebook.' 8 Beginning in September
2011, new members were required to integrate Spotify with a
Facebook account.19 Notwithstanding some complaints about
this change, 20 the company added as many as four million new
15 See, for example, Facebook, Guidelines: Built-In Read, Facebook Developers,
online at https: /developers.facebook.com/docs/submission-process/opengraph/guidelines/
built-in-read/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
16 See Part
I.B.
17 As Spotify's FAQ section explains, "[w]e aim to have all the world's music
available at Spotify. We are still in the process of acquiring licenses to all music in the
world (!), therefore it is possible that you won't be able to find some of your favourite
artists or tracks right now. We are signing new labels and adding a great amount [sic] of
new tracks every week." Spotify, Spotify Music Catalogue, Frequently Asked Questions,
online at http://www.spotify.com/us/help/faq/content/(visited Sept 15, 2013).
1s See Spotify, Spotify Privacy Policy *4.2 (cited in note 6). See also Spotify, Social
and Sharing, Frequently Asked Questions, online at http://www.spotify.comlus/help/
faq/social/#why-does-spotify-automatically-publish-my-playlists-on-my-profile-page
(visited Sept 15, 2013). Spotify's FAQ section cheerfully responds to the question, "[w]hy
does Spotify automatically publish my playlists on my profile page?" by explaining, "[i]t
saves you time. Otherwise you'd have to manually publish each new playlist you create."
Id.
19 See Anthony Bruno, Spotify Requires Facebook Accounts for New Users,
Ends
Invite-Only Beta (Billboardbiz Sept 27, 2011), online at http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/1 166440/spotify-requires-facebook-accounts-for-new-users-ends-invite-onlybeta (visited Sept 15, 2013).
20 See Parmy Olson, Spotify Tries to Soothe Angry Users Over Facebook Conditions
(Forbes Sept 28, 2011), online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/09/28/
spotify-tries-to-soothe-angry-users-over-facebook-conditions/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). See
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customers in the weeks immediately afterward. 2 1 In its first year
in the United States, Spotify members listened to over thirteen
billion songs. 22 Spotify now offers unprecedented access both to
music and to friends' musical choices.
As we will see in greater detail below, 23 companies dearly
wish to foster online word of mouth about their products, and
frictionless sharing allows them to do so in ways never before
possible. Before the advent of online social networks, logistical
obstacles prevented firms like the Washington Post, Spotify, or
Netflix from telling your friends about all of your interactions
with them. 24 Companies instead had to persuade their
customers to make recommendations to their friends and lacked
reliable means to facilitate that contact, control its substance, or
track it afterward. It was extremely difficult to promote such
word of mouth at a large scale. This overwhelming friction
against disclosure generally hid from public view all the movies
you watched, the articles you read, the online purchases you
made, and the plane tickets you booked, endowing them with
what
technologists
call "practical
obscurity." 25 These
transactions occurred in separate spaces than the one inhabited
by a person's social network. With frictionless sharing, people
were nudged-sometimes, arguably, shoved-into transmitting
word-of-mouth messages that sponsors craved.
Like many Silicon Valley boomlets, the passage of time
revealed that much early hype about frictionless sharing was
excessive. By May 2012, some technology journalists were

also Eliot Van Buskirk, Updated: Spotify Defends Facebook Requirement as 'Simple and
Seamless Experience' (Billboardbiz Sept 27, 2011), online at http://www.billboard.biz/
bbbiz/industry/digital-and-mobile/spotify-defends-facebook-requirement-as1005370802.story (visited Sept 15, 2013).
21 See Matt Rosoff, Spotify Has Snagged 4 Million New Users
In Six Weeks
(Business Insider Nov 8, 2011), online at http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-1108/techl3037247 1.Lspotify-facebook-integration-users (visited Sept 15, 2013).
22 See Emma Barnett, Spotify US Members Listened to 13bn Songs in One Year,
Technology News (The Telegraph July 23, 2012), online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/9420847/Spotify-US-members-listened-to- 13bn-songs-in-one-year.html
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (reflecting the number of songs consumers listened to in the
2011-2012 year).
23 See notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
24 McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1111-13
(cited in note 13).
25 See Woodrow Hartzog and Fredric D. Stutzman, The Case
for Online Obscurity,
101 Cal L Rev 1, 32-40 (2013) (defining online information as obscure if it lacks one or
more of four key factors: (1) search visibility; (2) unprotected access; (3) identification; or
(4) clarity).
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reporting in equally dramatic tones that new statistics showed
social reading apps were "crashing and burning" and users
"fleeing in droves." 26 This course correction in the narrative went
too far in the other direction, however; more careful analysis
showed anomalies in the usage numbers and attributed at least
part of the sudden decline to some differences in Facebook's data
collection methods and the changes in the design of its interface
mentioned earlier. 27 Nevertheless, the initial surge in
frictionless sharing activity faded permanently, and at least part
of the falloff probably resulted from consumer concern about the
privacy and information quality problems discussed below in
Part III.
Facebook had been the most ardent proponent of frictionless
sharing and the related notion it calls the "open graph."28 At a
major conference for developers in September 2011, the company
unveiled its new architecture for frictionless sharing with great
fanfare. 29 In fall 2012, Facebook continued to tweak its
architecture in ways that sought to address some of the most
serious concerns arising from frictionless sharing, particularly
by limiting it to the platform's defined "built-in actions" such as

26 For some of many examples in this vein,
see Daniel Terdiman, Facebook social
reader usage crashingand burning, CNET Tech Culture (CNET May 7, 2012), online at
http: //news.cnet.com/8301-10797_3-57429594-235/facebook-social-reader-usage-crashingand-burning/ (visited Sept 15, 2013); Sarah Jacobsson Purewall, Facebook's social
readers are fleeing in droves (PC World May 8, 2012), online at http://www.
pcworld.com/article/255210/facebookssocial reader users-are-fleeingin-droves.html
(visited Sept 15 2013).
27 See, for example, Jeff Sonderman, Facebook Explains Why Social Reading
Apps
Are Suffering, Poynter.org (May 8, 2012), online at http://www.poynter.org/Iatestnews/mediawire/173100/why-facebook-frictionless-sharing-apps-are-suffering-and-whatit-means/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). Different Facebook design changes are discussed in
notes 5 and 15 and their accompanying text.
28 See Facebook, Open Graph Concepts, Facebook Developers
(Facebook Dec 2012),
online at http: //developers.facebook.com/docs/opengraph/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). The
"social graph" is an associated term for the representation of the links between an entire
social network. Id. See also James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L Rev 1137,
1143 (2009) (defining "social graph" as "the entire network of users and explicit contact
links on a social network site" or "the idealized network of users and contact links that
would exist if the same site stored all significant human relationships").
29 See, for example, Josh Halliday, Facebook to Transform
Into an Entertainment
Hub (The Guardian Sept 22, 2011), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2011/sep/22/facebook-transform-entertainment-hub?intemp=239 (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(reporting on Facebook's unveiling of frictionless sharing at its F8 developers'
conference); Somini Sengupta and Ben Sisario, Facebook as Tastemaker, NY Times BI
(Sept 22, 2011) ("Facebook, in short, aims not to be a Web site you spend a lot of time on,
but something that defines your online - and increasingly offline - life.").
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listening to music or reading a web page. 30 Facebook explained
its motivation in part by noting negative reaction to some
aspects of frictionless sharing. 31 Observers have speculated that
Facebook also might have wanted to avoid the risk of regulatory
interventions. 32 A coalition of privacy advocacy groups led by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) had written to the
FTC upon the introduction of frictionless sharing the previous
year, urging the agency to investigate and restrict the practice. 33
The precise design of frictionless sharing remains a work in
progress, subject to continuous experimentation by both
Facebook and app developers. We have been down this road
before, with related past innovations like Facebook Beacon and
Facebook Connect, which were heralded as revolutionary and
then quickly discarded as failures. Whatever the exact design,
and whether implemented by Facebook or by other firms, the
significant and consistent trend is an imperative for social
networks and their business partners to encourage sharing,
even at the cost of some errors or dissatisfaction. 3 4 Whatever
frictionless sharing looks like next year or the year after, the
costs and benefits outlined in this Article will hold true.
B.

Netflix and the VPPA

During all the excitement about frictionless sharing in fall
2011, Netflix remained on the sidelines because of its concerns
s0 See Henry Zhang, Growing Quality Apps with Open Growth, Developer Blog
(Facebook Oct 10, 2012), online at http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2012/10/10/
growing-quality-apps-with-open-graph/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). The changes were rolled
out gradually between October 2012 and January 2013. Id.
a' Id ("When apps automatically publish stories on a person's behalf in a way that is
unexpected, such as when they browse an online store, it can surprise and confuse
people.").
32 See Jenna Gavin, Passive SharingIs Passe: Why ProtectingPrivacy in the Social
Sphere Preserves Value in the Channel (VentureBeat Nov 18, 2012), online at
http://venturebeat.com/2012/11/18/passive-sharing-is-passe-why-protecting-privacy-in(visited Sept
the-social-sphere-preserves-value-in-the-channel#jCOzZcWoyVUrehVV.99
15, 2013) ("Unless social networks proactively move to develop protocols and technologies
around privacy, the regulatory environment will mandate it and create a quagmire of
restrictions that will stymie growth and innovation and opportunity in the channel.").
3
See Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), et al, to Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, et al, *12-13 (Sept 29, 2011), online at http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/
EPICFacebookFrC_1etter.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("EPIC Letter").
34 I made the same point in an earlier article discussing Facebook Beacon in
particular and social marketing in general. See McGeveran, 2009 Ill L Rev at 113-22
(cited in note 13).
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that the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) limited its ability
to participate. Congress passed the VPPA in 1988.35 As often
happens with legislation to protect privacy, the proponents of
the bill acted in response to a particular attention-grabbing
incident. During the fervor over the nomination of Judge Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court, an enterprising reporter for an
alternative weekly newspaper in Washington, DC obtained the
judge's borrowing records from his neighborhood video rental
store and published an article about them. 36 Members of
Congress (perhaps afraid that reporters in their own hometowns
would get similar ideas) responded quickly. Displaying much
more unity than they had on the Bork nomination itself, both
chambers passed the measure by voice vote. 37 The resulting
statute uses legal rules to create friction against disclosures of
the movies individuals watch.
The VPPA applies to businesses engaged in the "rental,
sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar
audio visual materials."38 When first considered, the bill
included similar protection for library borrower records, but this
provision was dropped when senators disagreed about law
enforcement access to the records. 39 Before the recent
amendments, a service provider covered by the law could not
disclose any personally identifiable information about video
customers unless it secured "informed, written consent of the
consumer given at the time the disclosure is sought" or the
disclosure fell within one of several narrow exceptions. 40 In
3

VPPA, 18 USC § 2710 (cited in note 8).

See Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes Saga, The American Porch, online at
http://www.theamericanporch.com/bork2.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013). According to the
reporter's later account, he used the same rental store and the assistant manager
obligingly photocopied the handwritten records of the Bork family's rentals. Id at 3.
3 President Ronald Reagan signed the bill on November 5, 1988, three days before
the election to choose his successor.
3
18 USC § 2710(a)(4). The statute also covers subsequent recipients' handling of
personally identifiable information that is otherwise protected by the Act. See 18 USC
§ 2710(a)(4).
3 See The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, S Rep No 100-599, 100th Cong, 2d
Sess 1988, reprinted in 1988 USCCAN 4342-8. This same issue arose again, of course, in
debate about the USA PATRIOT Act in the first decade of this century. See Michael
Kelley, Patriot Act Extended for Four Years With No Change to Library Records
Provision', (Library Journal May 27, 2011), online at http://www.libraryjournal.
com/j/home/890795-264/patriot act extended for four.html.csp (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(describing the library records provision of the PATRIOT Act and the Act's extension in
2011).
40 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B).
Richards thus characterizes the old VPPA as a
3
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addition, the law always included such exceptions for disclosures
incident to the ordinary course of business or in response to
court orders or state or federal warrants. 41 Provided the
customer could opt out, another exception in the original law
allowed covered businesses to disclose general information about
a customer's rentals to third-party marketers, although not
particular titles or descriptions. 42 (So, for example, the original
VPPA permitted Netflix to disclose that you enjoy foreign films,
but not whether you've watched The Lives Of Others.43) Both the
old and new VPPA establish a private right of action and allow
minimum liquidated damages of $2,500 per violation, punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and any preliminary and equitable
relief the court deems appropriate.44
After almost twenty-five years one might expect the statute
to have become outdated, but its drafters took care to make the
VPPA flexible and technology-neutral. Long after VCRs were
displaced by DVDs and now by online streaming, the VPPA
remained current because it included "similar audio-visual
materials" in the definition of its scope.4 5 Some observers have

"confidentiality" rule. See Richards, 101 Georgetown L J at 694-96 (cited in note 14).
" 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(C), (E), and (F). These exceptions are narrow. For example,
even disclosures to law enforcement agencies pursuant to valid warrants require, in
part, prior notice to the customer. 18 USC § 2710(b)(3).
42 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(D). However, covered businesses may disclose the subject
matter of the customer's rentals if "the disclosure is for the exclusive use of marketing
goods and services directly to the consumers." 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii).
3 The Lives of Others (Sony Pictures Classics 2006). And, really, you should see it.
It is a marvelous German film about privacy and surveillance that won the 2006
Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film. That is my genuine recommendation,
disclosed with my consent.
44 18 USC § 2710(c). Courts have been reluctant to apply the private right of action
and damages provisions to other parts of the VPPA besides unauthorized disclosure,
such as its data retention limitations. See, for example, Sterk v Redbox Automated
Retail, LLC, 672 F3d 535, 538-39 (7th Cir 2012); Daniel v Cantrell, 375 F3d 377, 384-85
(6th Cir 2004). These courts still recognize that the private right of action and liquidated
damages do apply to the VPPA's disclosure rules, which are the ones relevant to
frictionless sharing. See Daniel, 375 F3d at 384. There is also a split among courts about
the availability of a private right of action against third parties who receive information
in violation of the VPPA's requirements, often law enforcement authorities. Compare
Amazon.com LLC v Lay, 758 F Supp 2d 1154, 1167 (WD Wash 2010) (holding that a
person may bring suit under the VPPA against third parties who impermissibly receive
information); Dirkes v Borough of Runnemede, 936 F Supp 235, 240 (D NJ 1996) (same),
with Daniel, 375 F3d at 381-82 ("[U]nder the plain language of the statute, only a 'video
tape service provider' (VTSP) can be liable."). Again, however, this has little bearing on
frictionless sharing. No matter what the VPPA says about recipients of information or
other third parties, Netflix might still be liable for unauthorized disclosures.
4
See, for example, S Rep No 100-599 at 5-6, 11-12 (cited in note 39) (discussing
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suggested that the VPPA's "written consent" provision might
require pen and paper rather than online authorization. 4 6 If that
were so, it would marginalize numerous older statutes that
require writings, but Congress addressed this concern
comprehensively years ago with passage of the E-SIGN Act.47
Cases interpreting that statute clearly and consistently find that
digital equivalents substitute for statutory requirements of a
writing. 48 Any other statutory construction would undermine
every clickwrap notification and "I agree" button on the internet.
Thus, the shift to the internet for both viewing movies and
manifesting consent did not undermine the original VPPA's
fundamental operation. The statute did prevent Netflix from
adopting precisely the same architecture as Spotify-but not
because of any reliance on outdated technology. Rather, the
underlying substantive provisions of the VPPA were
incompatible with the Spotify model. The consumer gives Spotify
one-time blanket consent to share all activity with Facebook
friends. The VPPA specifically required consent for each
disclosure. 49 However, the same networked digital technology
that makes frictionless sharing possible also would make it
much easier for Netflix to secure case-by-case consent today
than it was for a video store in 1988 when the VPPA passed. As

the need to keep private the viewing habits of individuals and including then-new "laser
discs" and "CDI technology" as examples of "similar audio visual materials"); In re Hulu
Privacy Litigation, 2012 WL 3282960, *5 (ND Cal) ("[A] plain reading of a statute that
covers videotapes and 'similar audio visual materials' is about the video content, not
about how that content was delivered."). Based in part on its careful analysis of the
Senate Report, the Hulu court concluded that "Congress used 'similar audio visual
materials' to ensure that VPAA's protections would retain their force even as
technologies evolve." In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, 2012 WL 3282960 at *5-6. See also
Mollett v Netflix, Inc, 2012 WL 3731542, *2 (ND Cal) (applying the VPPA to streaming
video provided by Netflix).
46 See, for example, Jules Polonetsky and Christopher Wolf, Viewers Should Be Able
to Share Their Playlists *1 (Roll Call Nov 29, 2011), online at http://www.rollcall.com/
issues/57_65/jules-polonetsky-christopherwolf viewers able sharemovie playlists210572-1.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
47 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act), Pub L
No 106-229, 114 Stat 467 (2000), codified at 5 USC §§ 7001-7031.
48 See, for example, Campbell v General Dynamics Government Systems Corp, 407
F3d 546, 556 (1st Cir 2005) (holding that the E-SIGN Act likely precludes any flat rule
that a contract to arbitrate is unenforceable under the [Americans with Disabilities Act]
solely because its promulgator chose to use e-mail as the medium to effectuate the
agreement"); Berry v Webloyalty.com, Inc, 2011 WL 1375665, *7-8 (SD Cal) (granting a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim because the E-SIGN Act means that clicking a
"yes" button satisfied written consent requirement in another federal statute).
4
See 18 USC § 2710(b)(2) (2012), prior to amendment by Pub L 112-258.
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I testified at a January 2012 Senate hearing about the VPPA,
Netflix could simply place a "PLAY AND SHARE" button
directly next to every "PLAY' button and comply with this
requirement.50 I will have more to say about this in Part V
below; for now, the key point is that the VPPA always allowed
sharing in social networks, just not completely "frictionless"
sharing.
Netflix showed no interest in the "PLAY AND SHARE"
button or any other means of operating under the original
VPPA. Instead, it lobbied Congress aggressively, and at
significant expense, to weaken the consent requirements in the
VPPA. 5s The company used dismissive rhetoric suggesting that
no musty, 25-year-old law could possibly address the problems of
today's fast-paced digital world. 52 It similarly argued that the
law was ambiguous, without spelling out any perceived
confusion. 53 As just demonstrated, however, the statute was
quite simple and easily applied to current technology. Netflix's

' See The Video Privacy Protection Act in the 21st Century, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary*2-3 (Senate Judiciary Committee Jan 31, 2012) (written testimony of William
McGeveran, University of Minnesota Law School), online at http://www.judiciary.
(visited Sept
senate.govlhearings/hearing.cfm?id=fl4e6e2889a80b6b53be6d4e412d460f
15, 2013) ("McGeveran Testimony").
s' See Brendan Sasso and Rachel Leven, Netflix hires more lobbyists for push on
video rental law, Hillicon Valley Blog (The Hill Apr 23, 2012), online at
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/223027-netflix-hires-top-firm-to-lobbyon-video-privacy-law (visited Sept 15, 2013) (reporting that Netflix had hired the law
firm Greenberg Traurig to lobby for amendment of the VPPA).
12 See Eric Engleman, Netflix-Facebook Link Stalls as Franken Favors Bork Law
(Bloomberg News Feb 20, 2012), online at http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-0221/netflix-facebook-link-stalls-as-senator-franken-backs-bork-video-law-tech.html
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Netflix CEO Reed Hastings, a Facebook board member,
criticizing VPPA as "outdated"); Michael Drobac, Help Us Bring Facebook Sharing to
Netflix USA (cited in note 9) (praising "forward-thinking members of Congress" who seek
to amend a "1980s law"); Hyman Testimony at *3 (cited in note 9) (opposing "trying to
graft specific notions about video privacy from almost 25 years ago into the dynamic
information age of today"); Casey Johnston, The Netflix lobby in Washington spent $1
million in two years (ARS Technica Dec 27, 2012), online at http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2012/12/the-netflix-lobby-in-washington-spent-1-million-in-two-years/
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
53 Michael Drobac, Help Us Bring Facebook Sharing to Netflix USA (cited in note 9)
(apologizing that "a 1980's law creates some confusion over our ability to let U.S.
members automatically share the television shows and movies they watch with their
friends on Facebook"); Julianne Pepitone, Why Netflix's Facebook App Would be Illegal,
CNN Money (Mar 27, 2012), online at http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/27/technology/
netflix-facebook/index.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Netflix spokesman Steve
Swasey saying, "tilt's ambiguous about whether it applies to us. We just don't know, and
we'd rather be in compliance than risk stepping over the line').
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general counsel made a stronger point at the Senate hearing
when he argued that it was unfair that video should be subject
to more stringent regulation than books or music. 54 1 responded
that, instead of diluting the VPPA, legislators should consider
applying its video rules to all media (or better yet, to all
sharing).55

During the post-election lame-duck session in 2012,
Congress passed legislation strongly supported by Netflix to
amend the VPPA; President Obama signed the bill in January
2013.56 The new law changes only the VPPA's consent
provisions, leaving the rest of the statute intact.5 7 From now on,
Netflix and other video providers may secure a consumer's
advance blanket approval for disclosures.5 8 Successful
amendments from several members of Congress did add a few
limitations to this more permissive consent requirement:
consumer approval expires after two years;5 9 consent must be
sought separately from other terms of service;60 and providers
5
Hyman Testimony at 3 (cited in note 9). See The Video Privacy Protection Act in
the 21st Century, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the
Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary *2-3 (Jan 31, 2012) (written testimony of
Christopher Wolf, Hogan Lovells US LLP), online at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/
12-1-3lWolfTestimony.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Wolf Testimony") (arguing that the
more stringent internet sharing rules for movies under the VPPA "makes no sense").
ss McGeveran Testimony at *2 (cited in note 50) ("If the committee revisits this
statute, it should consider extending protection to reading and listening habits as well as
viewing.").
56 Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub L No 112-258,
126
Stat 2414 (2013), codified at 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B).
5
There are other flaws in the legislation ultimately enacted. Most importantly,
while enacted with social media in mind, the statute dilutes consent requirements for all
disclosures. See McGeveran Testimony at *4 (cited in note 50). Now, by securing blanket
consent, video providers can reveal your individual movie choices to anyone for any
reason, including marketers, movie studios, or reporters for alternative weekly
newspapers. Even if Netflix does not choose to do so, future services may. In addition, in
response to the spurious concern that the original VPPA required consent in pen-andpaper written form, see note 46, the new statute specifically singles out the internet, a
step away from principles of technology neutrality. See 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B)
(requiring "informed, written consent, including through an electronic means using the
Internet"). Not only is this language unnecessary because of the E-SIGN Act, it may
actually make the situation worse by limiting consent to communications using internet
protocols rather than alternative systems, including some used today by Netflix's
competitors. See McGeveran Testimony at *4-5 (cited in note 50) (noting that this
internet-specific language might exclude mobile devices such as the Kindle, devices that
receive signals via satellite, and cable television transmissions including on-demand or
DVR services).
5
See 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
5
18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
0 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i).
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must offer, "in a clear and conspicuous manner," an option for
consumers to withdraw consent on a case-by-case basis or to
cancel it altogether. 6 ' Nevertheless, the VPPA now allows
Spotify-style frictionless sharing through its new Netflix Social
feature, which shows your Facebook friends all the movies you
watch in the Netflix interface. 62 To consider whether this is the
best direction for the law to move, I turn next to the benefits and
costs of easier sharing in social networks.
II. BENEFITS OF SOCIAL MEDIA DISCLOSURES
In my opinion, a properly designed social Netflix app would
be great. It could make it easier for people to swap playlists and
queues within their networks, to learn about movies from
trusted friends, and to chat about them. Personally, I use
Facebook and Twitter every day, and I listen to music on Spotify
"private session" with sharing
(although frequently in
functionality disabled). I can imagine using Netflix socially as
well.
This Part considers the benefits of authentic social sharing,
using Netflix and movies as its example throughout. It divides
the discussion somewhat artificially based on the beneficiaries:
me, us, and them. First, it explains the main advantages to me
as a speaker in social media (or to anyone who discloses personal
choices such as movie selections). Then it discusses what we all
gain, as individuals and as a society, by receiving these
messages from friends. Finally, it turns to them-the
intermediaries such as Netflix, Facebook, or content providers
like movie studios-and the reasons they are so keen to promote
these increased information flows. Any regulation of frictionless
sharing should strive to preserve all these benefits for me, us,
and them.

6

18 USC

§ 2710(b)(2)(B)(iii).

See Johnston, Introducing Netflix Social (cited in note 10). Unlike Spotify, linking
a Netflix account to Facebook automatically displays movie choices to friends within
Netflix, but the user still must take another step to share that information in friends'
Facebook News Feeds as well. Id. Netflix Social does not share a user's movie queue,
only those titles actually viewed. Id. After users activate Netflix Social, a small "don't
share this" icon displays when the movie begins and the user can click it to turn off
default sharing of that video. Id.
62
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Me: Benefits Of Disclosing Information

I benefit, as an individual, from sharing personal
information within my social network. 63 Facebook did not force
me, or nearly a billion other people, to use its service. Consumer
demand has driven the continued explosive growth of social
media. These customers obviously recognize value when they
purposefully share information with friends.
Individuals express themselves by announcing their tastes
and preferences to the world. 64 This is the same drive that leads
people to display radio station bumper stickers on their cars,
wear t-shirts referring to beloved sports teams or movies, and
compose long lists of favorites in online spaces like Facebook
profiles or dating sites. One recent study found that disclosing
personal information or opinions activates regions of the brain
associated with reward.6 5 Social media has become a key forum
for personal speech and identity formation and, by far, the most
significant for many ordinary people.6 6 Individuals' commentary
about films they have seen unquestionably represents valuable
communication-indeed, constitutionally protected speech. And,
as James Grimmelmann points out, social network profiles,
including things like shared movie recommendations, "aren't
just expressive of identity; they're also constitutive of it."67
Facebook users are creating whole selves on that blue-bordered
screen, and the resulting page becomes a persona of its ownreflecting the persona of the creator, of course, but also turning
into its own unique avatar, like a brand for the individual. In
this way, an individual's Facebook Self and Twitter Self join
Workplace Self and Out-Drinking-With- Close-Friends Self
among a person's intersecting identities.6 8

63 To avoid being presumptuous, I will use myself as the discloser here-but the
chances are high that you could step into my shoes.
64 See Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Aspects
of the Self 178 (Simon & Schuster 1995); Grimmelmann, 94 Iowa L Rev at 1152-53 (cited
in note 28).
65 Diana Tamir and Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About the Self is
Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 8038,
8041 n 21 (2012).
6
See, for example, danah boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Publics:
Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications, in Zizi Papacharissi, ed, A Networked SelfIdentity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites 39, 39-55 (Routledge 2011).
67 Grimmelmann, 94 Iowa L Rev at 1153 (cited in note 28).
6
Consider Erving Goffman, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life
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Another expressive benefit of disclosures comes from
promoting the work of others. For a devoted fan of a particular
restaurant, political cause, band, or movie, social media provides
a wonderful way to spread the word about it. Individuals accrue
several kinds of personal rewards from making these sincere
recommendations. 69 I can help both my friends and the artists or
activists whose work I admire. Like other altruistic acts,
matchmaking between my favorites and my friends makes me
feel good. These recommendations can also advance my personal
agenda if social disclosures get others interested in my favorites
and help ensure their success: more diners in that little
restaurant will help keep it open, and gathering more donors or
voters for that cause may add support for my personal political
views. The internet amplifies my recommendations to an
unprecedented degree, circulating them among all my friends in
a socially appropriate manner, allowing my friends to forward
them further, and allowing intermediaries to aggregate my
opinions with others. 70 By serving as a tastemaker among
friends and even strangers, I get to feel like part of the
cognoscenti-knowledgeable, hip, or artistically sensitive.
B.

Us: Benefits Of Receiving Information

We all benefit from listening in social networks as well as
from talking. Purposeful sharing of information is fundamental
to intimacy.7 1 Facebook is not the full equivalent of in-person
real-world
enhances
virtual sharing
but
exchanges,
relationships. For instance, the opportunity for friends to
discuss movies they have seen enhances their enjoyment of both
the friendship and the movie. When acquaintances discover that
they like the same things, it can intensify their bond, as anyone
who has ever compared favorite books and films on a first date
can attest. Properly designed social networking platforms
(Doubleday Anchor 1959).
9 See McGeveran, 2009 Ill L Rev at 1130 (cited in note 13) ("Many motivations
inspire individuals to engage in word-of-mouth interactions, including desires to feel
smart, to be helpful, to express themselves, or to affiliate themselves with groups that
share their opinions."). Of course, many businesses also offer more concrete incentives
like discounts to customers who refer their friends.
70 See Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark
Law, in Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis, eds, Trademark Law and Theory: A
Handbook of ContemporaryResearch 404, 411-12 (Edward Elgar 2008).
71 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L J 475, 484-86
(1968).
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facilitate these connections. It is easy to imagine a Netflix app
that allowed friends in different places to watch videos
"together" and discuss them in real time during viewing.7 2 This
could become the high-tech version of a scene in When Harry
Met Sally, where two friends watch Casablanca on television
while commenting to each other over the telephone. 3
Virtual sharing can enable real-world connections directly
as well. This may be particularly true with geolocation apps that
allow people to publicize their location, find out if friends are
nearby, and get recommendations from others within their social
network who have been to the same place. 74 In an enthusiastic
video promoting the new Google Latitude service, which adds
participating friends' locations to Google Maps, the narrator
determines that her parents made it home from the airport and
her friends are playing tennis nearby.7 5 Google, Foursquare, and
many other companies anticipate that people will find pervasive
passive disclosures about the whereabouts of their family and
friends very useful in daily life. 7 6 These interfaces embed
different amounts of friction now, but in general, they tend to
use always-on disclosure. A bill recently proposed in the Senate
would require permission for geolocation disclosures but would
7 According to a recent study by the Pew Center for the Internet and American
Life, an estimated 23 percent of mobile phone users have exchanged text messages with
friends while watching the same television program. See Aaron Smith and Jan Lauren
Boyles, The Rise of the "Connected Viewer", Pew Internet (Pew Research Center July 17,
2012),
online
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Connected-viewers/
Findings.aspx?view=all (visited Sept 15, 2013). Google has integrated YouTube into
Google+ Hangouts to allow this type of social viewing. See Angela Moscaritolo, Watch
YouTube Videos in Google+ Hangouts With New App (PC Mag.com June 15, 2012), online
at http: //www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2405863,00.asp (visited Sept 15, 2013).
1 When Harry Met Sally (MGM 1989). See also Argo (Warner Bros 2012) (featuring
a similar scene, set in 1979, where Ben Affleck's character talks to his son on the phone
and tunes his television to the same channel).
74 See, for example, Foursquare, About Foursquare (Jan 2013), online at
https://foursquare.comlabout/ (visited Sept 15, 2013); Footprints, Footprints Features
(Sollico Software 2012), online at http: //www.footprints.net/ (visited Sept 15, 2013);
Sarah Perez, Location-SharingApp Glympse Adds CalendarIntegration to EliminateAll
Those "I'm Running Late" Messages, Tech Crunch Apps (Tech Crunch Oct 16, 2012),
online at http: //techcrunch.com/2012/10/16Ilocation-sharing-app-glympse-adds-groupscalendar-integration-to-eliminate-all-those-im-running-late-messages/ (visited Sept 15,
2013).
1 Google, Google Latitude, Google Mobile (2011), online at http://www.google.com/
mobilellatitude/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
7 According to Forrester Research, however, only about 5 percent of adults use
such apps at present. Geoff Duncan, Forrester:Only 5 pct of adults use geo-social apps,
Digital Trends Mobile (Digital Trends Dec 6, 2011), online at http://www.digitaltrends.
com/mobile/forrester-only-5-pct-of-adults-use-geo-social-apps/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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allow one-time blanket authorization,7 7 similar to the amended
VPPA. 78
Increased information from friends about the things they
love helps each of us to find new things we will love too. Netflix,
Amazon, and many online retailers commonly recommend
products purchased by an aggregate of other patrons with
similar browsing patterns. Referrals within social networks are
even better because recipients know the actual person whose
lead they are following, rather than trusting the wisdom of a
vendor's algorithm. We rely on our friends to direct us to things
we will like because we value their opinions and often share
their preferences. Moreover, we can better assess their
reliability; if I like my brother-in-law's clothes but not his taste
in movies, I know which of his recommendations to follow.
I find an increasing portion of my internet browsing is
shaped by following others' links in Facebook and Twitter. A
recent survey and report by Oxford University's Reuters
Institute dramatically demonstrated the power of social media
in driving news readership. 9 The survey found that 41 percent
of respondents in the United States said they had used social
media as a source for locating news stories that they read within
the previous week.8 0 Links to web content are only one type of
useful recommendations conveyed through social sharing.
Spotify emphasizes this discovery as an integral aspect of its
service, declaring on its web site, "[m]usic is social."81 In a
broader 2006 study by Harris Interactive, a whopping 89
percent of respondents agreed that they "seek or use information
and advice from other people" about restaurants (25 percent
doing so to a "great extent"), and 76 percent sought such help
7
See Eric Engleman, Location-TrackingApps Would Need Permission in U.S. Bill,
Bloomberg Politics (Bloomberg Dec 4, 2012), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
(visited Sept
2012-12-04/location-tracking-apps-would-need-permission-in-u-s-bill.html
15, 2013).
' See Part I.B.
' Nic Newman, ed, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2012: Tracking the Future
of News, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism *15 (University of Oxford July
https: lreutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/
at
online
2012),
Publications/Other-publications[ReutersInstituteDigitalReport.pdf (visited Sept 15,
2013) ("Reuters Institute Report").
0 Reuters Institute Report at *27 (cited in note 79). This figure was significantly
higher than in four European nations surveyed, which probably results from lower
adoption of social media in those countries. Id.
8' Spotify, About us (2013), online at https://www.spotify.com/usl#features (visited
Sept 15, 2013) ("Music brings people together. That's why Spotify is so social.").
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about movies (15 percent did "to a great extent").8 2 Social
networks make that trustworthy advice more accessible.
Reliable information about our friends' preferences also
plays an integral role in the internet's well-known "long tail"
phenomenon, a concept popularized by Chris Anderson. 83 The
basic idea is that the demand for many products falls in a
power-law distribution so that, when plotted on a graph, a huge
spike on the left depicts a few items purchased by many people
and then a long tail trails off to the right where a large number
of offerings each attracts many fewer customers. 84 Distribution
of first-run feature films tends to follow this model: studios
produce a few blockbusters and then many other releases are
Hollywood bombs, niche offerings, independent or documentary
films, and older films. For the studios, the hits cross-subsidize
the misses. Distributors of many other cultural products like
books, popular music, and television programs traditionally
follow a similar pattern where a few big successes support the
entire enterprise, including many other offerings that make
little profit or lose money.8 5
Anderson explained how the internet changes this dynamic.
In movie rentals, the online service Netflix had a crucial
advantage over bricks-and-mortar Blockbuster Video. The latter
confronted fixed overhead costs, finite shelf space, and a limited
geographic area from which to draw customers. As a result, it
concentrated on offering a restricted number of broadly popular
titles that were sure to earn their keep in a limited inventory.
Concentrating on movies most likely to draw a sizable audience
tends to encourage appealing to the lowest common
denominator. Netflix, in contrast, can stock an effectively
infinite selection (and, as it shifts to streaming, it can even shed
additional costs such as warehouse facilities and shipping).
Crucially, online vendors like Netflix, Amazon, or iTunes can
make as much money on each customer selection from the long
tail as they do on each mega-hit. Setting licensing fees to one
8
Dee T. Allsop, et al, Word-of-Mouth Research: Principlesand Applications, 2007 J
Advertising Rsrch 398, 400. Comparatively, only 37 percent relied on "information and
advice from other people" about athletic shoes, and only 5 percent did so "to a great
extent." Id.
8
Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of
More 19-25 (Hyperion 2006).
84 Id at 15-26.
- Id at 35-40.
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side, a foreign art-house film like The Lives of Others can earn
the same profit margin per customer as a superhero sequel.8 6
With this increased choice, however, comes increased
confusion and difficulty locating what we want. For this reason,
Anderson sees a critical role for recommendation systems and
other tools that allow the "wisdom of crowds" to help us identify
the best choices, such as ratings and reviews through services
like Amazon, Angie's List, Trip Advisor, and Yelp. 87 As we saw
above, recommendations from people with whom we have
particularly strong affinity, trust, and understanding are among
the most valuable. Crucially, sociology research demonstrates
that we profit significantly not only from the advice of very close
friends but also from the recommendations of our "weak ties"acquaintances beyond our innermost social circle.8 8 In this way,
social networks help us steer a path through the clutter of the
long tail toward the things we will enjoy.
The long tail also works beyond the realm of books, music,
and movies. Smaller-scale competitors of all types can use the
same techniques to gain access to the market against dominant
incumbents. Recommendations, "likes," and sharing in social
networks help these efforts tremendously. Earlier in 2012, a
start-up firm called Dollar Shave Club launched from beta with
a hilarious advertising video that mocked overpriced razors from
Gillette and Schick and promoted its monthly razor blade
subscription plans. 89 The ad rapidly went viral, largely through
social networks, and although the company does not release
sales figures, one business journalist estimated it may now be
earning $200,000 a month in revenue.90 Online word of mouth
allowed this low-cost competitor to enter a market previously
8 Id at 88-97.
' Anderson, The Long Tail at 106-08 (cited in note 83). See also Goldman, Online
word of mouth and its implications for trademark law at 411-12 (cited in note 70); Frank
Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of
Categorizers,60 Vand L Rev 133, 178-81 (2007).
8 See Christophe Van den Bulte and Stefan Wuyts, Social Networks and Marketing
34-36 (Marketing Science Institute 2007) (summarizing the network theory research by
Mark Granovetter and others analyzing the importance of weak ties); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U Chi L Rev 919, 953-58 (2005)
(same).
89 See Dollar Shave Club, Dollar Shave Club (2012), online at http://www.
dollarshaveclub.com/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
9 See J.J. Colao, Dollar Shave Club: Breaking The Razor Blade Monopoly, *2
(Forbes Apr 3, 2012), online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/04/03/dollarshave-club-breaking-the-razor-blade-monopoly/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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controlled by two enormous corporate entities and helped
thousands of individuals locate a convenient, low-cost service.
Beyond the benefits to individuals who receive helpful tips
about long tail offerings from their friends, increased
availability of personal recommendations confers significant
benefits on society in the aggregate. Sharing rewards quality by
driving people towards the best stuff. Whether ordinary
products like razor blades or cultural ones like films, the
enhanced information from social networks fosters competition,
supports small businesses, and increases consumer choice. This
is even true for those individuals who don't themselves elect to
participate directly-the conversation initiated and enabled by
social media brings previously obscure options to the forefront
where they then garner the attention of traditional tastemakers
and a wider public. In the case of artistic works like books or
movies, this process can improve both the quality and diversity
of our shared culture as well.
Ideally, a recommendation ecosystem animated by social
networks and accessible communication may help revolutionize
commerce and culture-even though we always must be
cautious not to overstate the current or potential payoff. 91
Instead of a creative economy obsessed only with developing the
next
blockbuster,
digital
distribution
and
digital
recommendation could allow people to find and support highquality offerings that previously lacked realistic access to the
marketplace. 92 For example, a technologically enabled long tail
could reduce barriers for musicians and costs for their fans. 93
The maturation of user-generated content platforms such as
YouTube may advance this goal. 94 There remain significant
obstacles to attracting an audience independently, of course. 95

9' See Van den Bulte and Wuyts, Social Networking and Marketing at 39-49 (cited
in note 88) (examining potential of social marketing and cautioning against exaggerated
or unsupported claims of opinion leaders' effects on marketing).
92 See Anderson, The Long Tail at 180-89 (cited in 83).
9
See William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
Entertainment 13-31 (Stanford 2004).
9' See, for example, Jean Burgess, YouTube and the Formalization of Amateur
Media, in Dan Hunter, et al, eds, Amateur Media: Social, Cultural, and Legal
Perspectives 53, 53-57 (Routledge 2013).
9s Brad Abruzzi, a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard University, has described his real-world experience self-publishing his novel
through Amazon in ambivalent terms. See Brad Abruzzi, Amazons, Witches, and Critics
- A Liberated Novelist Asks, 'Wow What?", Berkman Center for Internet & Society
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But any shift toward such increased and disintermediated
choices would require social recommendations to augment
traditional gatekeepers such as critics, record labels, radio
stations, television networks, and librarians.9 6
In sum, we gain at least three types of benefits from social
sharing: first, we find new ways to interact and strengthen
relationships; second, we learn of previously unknown options
from our friends; and finally, a thriving recommendation
ecosystem can improve the quality and diversity of all kinds of
products for everyone, particularly cultural offerings like
movies.
C.

Them: Benefits To Intermediaries

Finally, of course, intermediaries such as Facebook, Netflix,
and moviemakers benefit from frictionless sharing because it
constitutes free publicity for their respective businesses.
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg talks about the rise of
frictionless sharing in grandiose terms modeled on Moore's Law;
each year for the foreseeable future, he predicts, the amount of
data disclosed about individuals online will double. 9 7 While the
stakes may be especially high for Facebook, numerous other
players also promote frictionless sharing. Every social
networking platform-and every publisher and record label and
app developer and web site hungry for traffic-wants to shift as
many aspects of our daily lives as possible from presumptively
solitary experiences to social ones.9 8 They know that all of us are

(Harvard July 31, 2012), video and audio recordings online at http://cyber.law.harvard.
edulevents/luncheon/2012/07/Abruzzi (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Brad Abruzzi, New
Jersey's Famous Turnpike Witch (Amazon 2012), online at http://www.amazon.com/
Jerseys-Famous-Turnpike-Witch-ebook/dpBOO7YXJHWI (visited Sept 15, 2013).
9 See generally Angela Watercutter, Music Bloggers Hack Record Industry by
Launching Indie Labels, Underwire-music (Wired.com July 13, 2011), online at
http://www.wired.com/underwire/2011/07/blog-record-labels/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
9' See Paul Boutin, The Law of Online Sharing (MIT Technology Review Jan/Feb
2012), online at http://www.technologyreview.com/web/39321/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Moore's Law is the principle, familiar to everyone in Silicon Valley, that a chip will be
capable of holding twice as many transistors every two years (or, by some reckonings,
eighteen months), resulting in exponentially increased computer power and decreased
cost since the 1960s. See Michael Kanellos, Moore's Law to roll on for another decade,
CNET Business Tech (CNET Feb 10, 2003), online at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001984051.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
See, for example, Shayndi Raice, The End of Channel Surfing?, Wall St J B5 (Aug
9'
7, 2012) (describing development of "social TV" applications that will transmit
information within social networks about the television programs viewed by friends).
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more likely to click a link or download a song if we see a friend
doing so. If "Zuckerberg's Law" is just halfway right, frictionless
sharing will remake the boundaries between public and private.
More mentions in social media draw more eyeballs to the
underlying content. A digital media executive at The Guardian,
which participates in Facebook's frictionless sharing program,
stated that the site subsequently received more inbound visits
from Facebook than from Google searches.99 Social media
reportedly accounts for almost 10 percent of traffic to the web
site of The Economist.00 An intermediary that facilitates
frictionless sharing also benefits from this free advertising every
time somebody sends messages through its services. Spotify
added millions of members when it shifted to a frictionless
sharing model integrated with Facebook. In Spotify's "freemium"
business model, each of these new customers either increases
the audience for advertising in the app or becomes a potential
recruit to upgrade to the premium paid service. 0 1 These are the
compelling business arguments that made Netflix so eager to
introduce frictionless sharing throughout its services.
Marketers believe "word of mouth" is among the most
powerful forms of promotion for a product or service, from
household goods to books. Consumers find information from a
disinterested person who is similar to themselves to be
"immediate, personal, credible, and relevant." 10 2 For movies, in
particular, word of mouth is more influential than almost any
other source of information.103 Recall the study indicating that
over three-quarters of people seek out advice from friends when
deciding whether to see a movie.104 A social Netflix would allow
individuals to send and receive precisely that most valuable type
of information.

9

Reuters Institute Report at *15 (cited in note 79).

100 Id.

101 See Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Spotify UK Shows That the Freemium
Model Is Not 'Unsustainable' (Billboardbiz Oct 9, 2012), online at http://www.billboard.
biz/bbbizlindustry/digital-and-mobile/business-matters-spotify-uk-shows-that-the1007975522.story (visited Sept 15, 2013).
102 Maria Flores Letelier, Charles Spinosa, and Bobby J. Calder, Strategies for Viral
Marketing, in Dawn lacobucci and Bobby Calder, eds, Kellogg on Integrated Marketing
90, 90 (Wiley 2003).
103 See Yong Liu, Word of Mouth for Movies: Its Dynamics and Impact on Box Office
Revenue, 70 J Marketing No 3, 74, 74-87 (2006).
10
See note 82 and accompanying text.
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The internet, and social networking in particular, allows
word of mouth to travel further and faster than ever before. 0 5
Facebook has staked its future profitability in large part on the
notion that buzz from friends about a product or service will be
especially powerful publicity that the company can eventually
monetize with marketers. Zuckerberg calls these "trusted
referrals" the "Holy Grail" for advertisers.10 6 Increasingly,
monetizing word of mouth will become part of the financial
structure of all network-connected services, from Facebook and
Twitter to Netflix and razor companies.
Most of us largely accept the notion that tracking and
monetizing personal information, particularly through targeted
marketing, allows websites such as Facebook, Google, and many
newspapers to remain free of (monetary) charge. 0 7 Likewise,
maintaining an open flow of shared information about movies
and similar tastes can help support the popular online services
that bring us information, content, and social connection.
Compared to targeted advertising or data mining, the promotion
of sharing may provide a less invasive way for businesses like
Facebook or Netflix to earn more revenue. After all, designed
correctly, the platforms are helping us do exactly what we
already want.
Needless to say, these benefits to me, to us, and to them
must be balanced against costs. The next Part considers the
most serious of these.

105
See Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark
Law at
411-13 (cited in note 70); McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1109-13 (cited in note 13).
106
See Dan Farber, Facebook Beacon Update: No Activities Published Without
User
Proactively Consenting (ZDNet Nov 29, 2007), online at http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/
?p=7188 (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Louise Story, Facebook is marketing your brand
preferences (with yourpermission), NY Times Technology (NY Times Nov 7, 2007), online
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/technology/07iht-07adco.8230630.html
(visited
Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Zuckerberg as saying "[njothing influences a person more than a
recommendation from a trusted friend"); Facebook, Facebook Unveils Facebook Ads,
Facebook Newsroom (Nov 6, 2007), online at http://newsroom.fb.com/News/235/
Facebook-Unveils-Facebook-Ads (visited Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Zuckerberg as saying
"[slocial actions are powerful because they act as trusted referrals and reinforce the fact
that people influence people").
'0 Consider Jan Whittington and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy's Price,
90 NC L Rev 1327 (2012).
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III. CONCERNS ABOUT FRICTIONLESS SHARING
People who are dimly aware that frictionless platforms
might "share" their activities passively are not engaging in the
type of authentic sharing that maximizes the benefits discussed
in Part II. Resulting disclosures can invade privacy. The
potential negative consequences for privacy extend beyond
momentary embarrassment, impinging on social identity and
intellectual privacy. In addition to privacy issues, extensive
passive sharing gluts information channels with half-hearted
messages about our friends' choices in place of their intentional
and enthusiastic recommendations. The resulting overload could
degrade the online recommendation culture permanently. This
Part reviews these major concerns about frictionless sharing
that must be weighed against the potential benefits discussed
above.
A.

Misclosures And Privacy

The most obvious concerns about frictionless sharing are
privacy-related. Social apps are designed to make it as likely as
possible that people automatically inform their social networks
about their activities. The Washington Post Social Reader app
within Facebook, for example, is quite easy to install by mistake
and not at all easy to deactivate. Suppose you have not
authorized the Social Reader yourself and you receive a message
from the app in your Facebook News Feed indicating that a
friend has read a particular article. If you click on the link, the
next screen presents two buttons, "Okay, Read Article" (which is
the default choice, highlighted in blue) or "Cancel" (a gray
button half the size of the first).10 8 Only the much smaller print
below explains that clicking the "Okay, Read Article" button also
activates social reading functionality so that subsequently the
Post may disclose any article you read to all your Facebook
friends. Once turned on, it takes some effort to avoid sharing
articles from the Post, and you do not receive notice each time
the app sends out a notification to your social network.109 While

10 Screenshot on file with author. See also Molly Wood, How Facebook is ruining
sharing, CNET News (CNET Nov 18, 2011), online at http://news.cnet.com/830115,
2013)
(visited Sept
31322_3-57324406-256/how-facebook-is-ruining-sharing/
(describing some of Facebook's problematic sharing features).
09 See Nickolay Lamm, How To Keep Social Readers From Spamming All Your
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Facebook's recent changes in requirements for frictionless
sharing design improve transparency, the guidelines still allow
this design.110

Social media architecture designed to eliminate friction
inevitably will cause more errors. I know this is so because I
have spoken to multiple friends who were quite sheepish to
discover that they had unintentionally broadcast on Facebook
that they read certain news articles or watched certain videos."1
Even when an individual knowingly activates a frictionless
sharing app, it is difficult to remember that one's actions are
broadcast. Spotify prompts me rather insistently to log on as
soon as I power up my computer, and I sometimes do so and
start playing music before I recall that I did not activate its
"private session" feature as I intended.
These are the sorts of mistakes that human-computer
interaction scholar Kelly Caine calls by the catchy name of
"misclosures." 112 Frictionless sharing makes misclosures more
likely because it removes practical obscurity on which people
have implicitly relied when assessing the likely audience that
Facebook Friends (AllFacebook Jan 19, 2012), online at http://allfacebook.com/facebookreaders b74261 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (describing how to change the sharing settings on
the Post's app).
10 See Facebook, Guidelines, Facebook Developers (cited in note 15). See also note
30 and accompanying text (describing Facebook's changes to sharing programs). The new
rules rely on an amorphous boundary between situations where users "perform actions
in [an] app" and those where they merely "browse, view, discover or otherwise look at
content." Facebook, Understanding the Open Graph Submission Process, Facebook
Developers,
online at https: /developers.facebook.comldocs/opengraph/submissionprocess/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). 'While users can choose to restrict sharing, the app
developer still sets the default level. See Facebook, Open Graph Overview, How Open
Graph Works, Facebook Developers, online at https://developers.facebook.com/docs/
opengraphloverview/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). In response, some frictionless sharing,
including the Post Social Reader, has moved to standalone apps rather than apps housed
within Facebook. See Lauren Indvik, Washington Post Moves Social Reader Off
Facebook, Mashable (Mashable Dec 14, 2012), online at http://mashable.com/2012/12/14/
washington-post-social-reader-off-facebook/ (visited Sept 15, 2013). The new Washington
Post platform can function independently from Facebook, but the app discourages this.
See Washington Post, Social Reader, Frequently Asked Questions (Washington Post),
online at http://help.socialreader.com/faqs/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("You don't have to log
in through Facebook to experience Social Reader, but doing so helps us deliver a better
news experience based on your interests and what your friends are recommending. It
also makes it easier to share what you're reading and comment on articles.").
"' Richards has had similar conversations with his acquaintances. See Richards,
101 Georgetown L J at 713-14 (cited in note 14).
112 Kelly E. Caine, Supporting Privacy by Preventing Misclosure, in CHI '09
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems 3145, *3147 (ACM Digital
Library 2009), online at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1520340.1520448 (visited Sept 15,
2013).
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would find out about their activities.113 In other words,
frictionless sharing can wrench individuals' actions from one
context to another, undermining their privacy expectations in
the process.114 As the privacy advocates' letter to the FTC
explained:
Under the previous privacy framework, sharing content
on Facebook was an active experience: a user had to
"like" or comment or otherwise take some action in order
for Facebook to publish a connection between the user
and the item with which she was interacting. Now, under
the frictionless sharing model, content sharing is a
passive experience in which a social app prompts the user
once, at the outset, to decide the level of privacy for the
app (with "public" being a common default) and then
proceeds to share every bit of information obtained
thereafter. 115
Why do misclosures create privacy problems? To start with
the simplest case, certain facts are just plain embarrassing.
Media choices and other purchases often reveal medical, sexual,
or otherwise personal matters. During the VPPA hearing,
Senator Al Franken (D-MN) offered the hypothetical example of
someone who watched Yoga for Health: Depression and
GastrointestinalProblems and accidentally broadcast the fact on
Facebook.11 6 Enough individuals view sexually explicit material
to represent an important, albeit declining, profit source for
television providers.117 Even beyond such inherently private
matters, people may not want to admit that they rock out to
Justin Bieber hits at home on a Saturday night. Or they may
prefer not to disclose how many hours of bad reality television
See Hartzog and Stutzman, 101 Cal L Rev at 21-26 (cited in note 25).
See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity
of Social Life 236-37 (Stanford 2010) (discussing concept of "contextual integrity" as a
keystone to privacy).
u1 EPIC Letter at *9 (cited in note 33).
116 See Engleman, Netflix-Facebook Link Stalls as Franken
Favors Bork Law (cited
in note 52) (describing how Franken and privacy advocates are skeptical of allowing
blanket permission and arguing that consent should be handled on a case-by-case basis).
117 See Sam Schechner and Jessica E. Vascellaro, TV Porn Doesn't
Sell Like It Used
To, Wall St J Technology (Wall St J Aug 5, 2011), online at http://online.wsj.com/article/
2013)
(visited Sept 15,
SB10001424053111903885604576488540447354036.html
(reporting statistics from SNL Kagan showing "$899 million in revenue from adult videoon-demand and pay-per-view in 2010, down from a peak of $1 billion in 2008").
113
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they really watch. A dribble of disclosures about our tastes over
time adds up. 118 In the aggregate, they expose us to broader
judgments or misjudgments that can harm our dignity,
autonomy, and serenity. 119 And they represent a loss of
individual control that offends those same core personal
interests.120
Misclosures through frictionless sharing can be considerably
more invasive because they go directly to people with whom we
have relationships. Most of us realize at some level that credit
bureaus, data brokers, search engines, and web sites assemble
massive dossiers about each of us.1 2 1 Yet in response most
Americans sigh wistfully and click "I agree"; almost no one
seems to object to the fact that Netflix as a corporation collects
data showing all the movie choices of over twenty-four million
people. Even the stringent original VPPA included an exception,
which remains in the amended statute, allowing disclosures of
general personal data to third-party marketers. 122 Richard
Posner has reasoned that many people find disclosures to data
processors acceptable because they do not anticipate any impact
on their personal interests-as would occur if the same
information filtered back to their social circle. 123 Consumers
suffer harm when personal information unexpectedly crosses
boundaries, such as the one between faceless Netflix and our
us For a discussion of the aggregate privacy harm issue, see A. Michael Froomkin,
The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan L Rev 1461, 1502-05 (2000) (discussing cumulative effect
of information transfers and resulting "privacy myopia" that interferes with judgments
about individual disclosures).
119 See, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and
the Play of Everyday Practice 107-27 (Yale 2012); Daniel J. Solove, The Future of
Reputation 63-75 (Yale 2007); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and PersonalData,
117 Harv L Rev 2055, 2069-72 (2004) (discussing the "commodification" of private data).
20 The
Electronic Frontier Foundation has promulgated three principles for
consumer protection in social networks, and two of them-the rights to informed
decision-making and control-tie directly to these privacy issues. See Kurt Opsahl, A
Bill of Privacy Rights for Social Network Users (Electronic Frontier Foundation May 19,
2010), online at https: llwww.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/bill-privacy-rights-social-networkusers (visited Sept 15, 2013).
121
See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the
Information Age 22-26 (New York University 2006).
122 18 USC § 2710(b)(2)(D). For additional discussion of this exception, see notes 4243 and accompanying text.
123 Richard Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75
U Chi L Rev 245, 251 (2005)
("[A]s long as people do not expect that the details of their health, love life, finances, and
so forth, will be used to harm them in their interactions with other people, they are
content to reveal those details to strangers when they derive benefits from the
revelation.").
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friends
on Facebook,
without
sufficient
warning
or
explanation.124
Frictionless sharing reveals the information to exactly the
most significant
audience:
our family, friends,
and
acquaintances. In short, we care most keenly about our
reputation among those we know. As I said in my congressional
testimony, "Ask yourself whether you would be more
uncomfortable showing your entire movie-watching history to
your mother or to a faceless advertising company."125 Much
significant philosophical and theoretical work on privacy
emphasizes its close link to interpersonal relationships.12 6 In a
particularly precise examination of this connection, Julie Inness
explains privacy as respect for individual choices-including
choices to reveal information-that embody a person's "love,
liking, and care" for others. 127 Courts acknowledge the
significance of relationships to privacy when they find the
publicity requirement for the disclosure tort satisfied by release
of information to a "particular public" with special connection to
the plaintiff rather than to the entire world.128 We have seen
how we pay more attention to recommendations from people we
know precisely because we have a stake in their opinion.
Conversely, that very same mutual regard makes inaccurate or

124
See John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly
Interconnected Systems 81-86 (Basic Books 2012) (discussing case studies where
companies created "interoperability" by transferring data between distinct systems and
violated privacy expectations as a result). See also Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at
236-37 (cited in note 114).
125
McGeveran Testimony at *4 (cited in note 50).
126
For important examples of this substantial literature, see generally Julie Inness,
Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation (Oxford 1992) (evaluating critically the connections
between privacy and close relationships while advancing a control and intimacy based
definition of privacy); Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in
Ferdinand D. Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology 403,
403-16 (Cambridge 1984); Fried, 77 Yale L J at 477-83 (cited in note 71).
127
Inness, Privacy,Intimacy, and Isolation at 106 (cited in note 126).
128
See, for example, Miller v Motorola, Inc, 560 NE2d 900, 903 (111 App 1990);
Beaumont v Brown, 257 NW 2d 522, 531-32 (Mich 1977), overruled on different grounds
by Bradley v Board of Education of Saranac Community Schools, 565 NW2d 650, 657-58
(Mich 1997). Lior Strahilevitz criticizes this approach in tort law because he believes it
could "render some casual gossip by unsophisticated parties tortious." See Strahilevitz,
72 U Chi L Rev at 945 n 88 (cited in note 88). Putting aside whether this might be so in
tort law, frictionless sharing is not the same sort of communication, and any legal
restriction would not apply to the same sort of ordinary person. Moreover, at bottom the
proposals in Part V are more an architectural response than a legal response. See Part
V. These distinctions make his critique inapplicable here.
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embarrassing information about us more damaging when our
friends hear it.
Perhaps most importantly, the risk of misclosures about our
reading, viewing, and listening habits can lead to especially
negative additional repercussions for both the individual and
society. The brand of toothpaste I buy tells you much less about
my inner self than do the books I download, the web pages I
browse, or the music and movies I stream. Yet the most
enthusiastic embrace of frictionless sharing comes from
precisely these quarters-The Washington Post, Spotify, and, of
course, Netflix. As we will see in Part V, good design can address
these problems, especially if supported by legal and market
forces. But we have seen already how some badly designed
frictionless sharing interfaces do not give users clear notice that
their activities are shared and others force them to be on
constant guard against misclosures. Accepting this architecture
could endanger some of our most cherished values.
Neil Richards coined the term "intellectual privacy" to
describe our compelling interest in keeping our reading, viewing,
and listening activities to ourselves-and the complementary
danger that exposure of these individual choices will constrain
the freedom to explore and experiment with ideas and art.129 His
theory builds on varied sources, from other legal scholars such
as Marc Blitz and Julie Cohen, 130 to sociological literature in
surveillance studies, and the classic examples of Bentham's
Panopticon and Orwell's telescreen.131 In short, the possibility
that we might be monitored leads us to censor ourselves.1 32
Traditionally, the greatest threat to individual private space
for contemplation came from the state, and constitutional

See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex L Rev 387, 389 (2008).
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent
130 See generally
Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a FirstAmendment Theory for
an UnaccompaniedRight to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L Rev 799 (2006) (discussing
the First Amendment right to receive information); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn L Rev
981 (1996) (evaluating the interaction between copyright protections and the right to
anonymously read online information).
131 See Richards, 101 Georgetown L J at 704-05 (cited in note 14).
132 As Jonathan Zittrain explains the dangers of eroded private spaces: 'Today we
are all becoming politicians.... Ubiquitous sensors threaten to push everyone toward
treating each public encounter as if it were a press conference, creating fewer spaces in
which citizens can express their private selves." Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the
Internet-And How to Stop It 212 (Yale 2008).
129

15]

THE LAW OF FRICTION

45

doctrine sought to shield individuals from intrusions into their
reading, writing, and thought processes under both the First
Amendmentl3 3 and the Fourth Amendment. 134 Richards argues
that the private sector, through its promotion of frictionless
sharing, now poses a similar threat to the solitary acts of
reading and thinking. 135 If pervasive disclosure becomes the
norm, individuals might hesitate before downloading, browsing,
or streaming, effectively chilling their engagement in
intellectual or artistic activity.
Not only could unwanted disclosures inhibit individuals
from engaging with certain books, websites, or films, it could
actually begin to distort their thought processes. Paul Schwartz
has explained this aspect of privacy by referring to the concept
of preference falsification in social norm theory.136 Everyday
social pressures and the human desire to please others
constantly influence individuals' presentation of themselves.
Eventually preference falsification can alter a person's views
and tastes, driving him or her toward conformity with peers.
And when individuals don't have enough control over the
disclosure of information about those preferences, the
falsification can spread throughout their media diet, increasing
their conformity. 137 That, after all, is how the Panopticon and
the telescreen work: the subjects do not know whether they are
being watched, so they always act as if they are.
Many people experience crude versions of preference
falsification in junior high school; they start to say they like the
same bands or TV shows as their friends, and over time, their
tastes evolve to the point that they actually do like them. To be
sure, learning from certain friends' wise recommendations
See, for example, Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557, 564-65 (1969) (invoking
First
Amendment); Tattered Cover, Inc v City of Thornton, 44 P3d 1044, 1053-54 (Colo 2002)
(invoking state constitutional law); Richards, 87 Tex L Rev at 393-407 (cited in note
129). See generally Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
NYU L Rev 112 (2007).
13
See, for example, Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis
dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations"), overruled in part by Katz v United
States, 389 US 347, 353 (1967).
135 See Richards, 101 Georgetown L J at 712-18 (cited in note 14).
1as See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn L Rev 815, 840-43
(2000).
137 See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U Pa L Rev 1, 97 (1991); Schwartz, 32
Conn L Rev at 840-43 (cited in note 136).
133
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drives some of this transformation in tastes, but at least some of
it is a pernicious hollowing out of individuality. The wisdom of
the crowd can turn into groupthink instead. (Plus, it saddles us
with a lot of vapid boy bands.)
These harms most obviously affect the individual subjects of
disclosures. Yet resulting
unwanted frictionless-sharing
problems of a chilling effect, the distortion of individuals' views,
and interference with honest discourse would hurt all of us, both
speakers and listeners. If frictionless sharing becomes pervasive,
we risk the creation of a fishbowl society where a norm of
disclosure forces all of us to act as if we are being watched at all
times. The central importance of intellectual privacy for our
polity and culture gives rise to an especially compelling collective
public interest in maintaining boundaries. 138 For this reason,
legal rules ought to protect personal information more
comprehensively when it implicates intellectual privacy,
perhaps similar to the way the European Union ("EU") Privacy
Directive applies more stringent regulation to certain categories
of "sensitive data." 139 As Richards puts it, "If we value a
pluralistic society or the cognitive processes that produce new
ideas, then some measure of intellectual privacy, some respite
from cognitive surveillance, is essential." 140
Spammification and Information Quality

B.

Have your eyes begun to skim past the Spotify items in your
news feed? Mine have. This speaks to a crucial concern about
frictionless sharing that is distinct from privacy. Unintentional
or half-hearted disclosures could destroy the recommendation
ecosystem. This Part will begin by discussing a reduction in
information quality and then look at the corresponding increase
in quantity.
First, frictionless sharing degrades information quality.
Automated disclosures of page views, downloads, or playlists do
not always match up with intentional recommendations. Apps

See Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723, 740-41 (1999).
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Art 8 of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (EurLex), online at http://eur(visited
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServfLexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML
Sept 15, 2013).
140 Richards, 87 Tex L Rev at 404 (cited in note 129).
13s
13
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that look over a user's shoulder during web browsing
misrepresent casual clicking as conscious choices to recommend
particular links. The fact that your friend watched or read or
listened to something does not mean that your friend liked it or
recommends it.
Thus, removing "friction" also removes the very choice that
gives my browsing or my playlist any value to my friends. I
previously made this argument about social marketing
messages, such as those transmitted by Facebook's disastrous
Beacon program, which allowed web sites to disclose an
individual's activity on partner web sites in the news feeds of
that person's Facebook friends. What I said there is equally true
of other forms of frictionless sharing:
An in-person recommendation to a friend, or even a
general review written on a blog, requires the endorser's
thought and volition. Recipients of these trusted referrals
rely on them in part precisely because of their
voluntariness. Routinized social marketing messages,
however, require no such effort or choice, which
diminishes their value from heartfelt true endorsements
to mechanized impersonal advertisement. 141
In short, friction often comes to mean the same thing as
intent or choice, and those mental states are the ones that make
the shared information valuable. People pay attention to these
messages precisely because their friend made the effort to send
them. When instead they are sent frictionlessly or passively,
they lack that value.142
Frictionless sharing also lacks context.143 I help my nineyear-old daughter make playlists, and I assure you I do not like
every song they contain. A friend who took one of these playlists
as my recommendation of music to try had better enjoy a certain
type of top 40 dance pop, because I don't. Sometimes while

McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 13).
See Molly Wood, How Facebook Is Ruining Sharing (cited in note 108) ("Sharing
and recommendation shouldn't be passive. It should be conscious, thoughtful, and
amusing-we are tickled by a story, picture, or video and we choose to share it . .. We
choose these gems from the noise. Open Graph will fill our feeds with noise, burying the
gems.").
143
See Solove, The Future of Reputation at 66-71 (cited in note 119) (discussing
reputation interests against the judgments of others who do not know the context of
information).
141
142
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surfing the web I click idly because a clever headline or an
arresting photo catches my eye, but the page that loads turns
out not to be worthwhile. The nature of the web encourages this
sort of exploratory browsing because the back button restores
you after any wrong turn. But again, friends who choose to look
at an article because I glanced at it for 15 seconds probably do
not discover hidden gems as a result. Caine's misclosures are not
recommendations.
These inaccurate indicators of individuals' preferences also
interfere with their ability to tell their own story. As noted
above, people engage in authentic sharing as a means of selfexpression, identity formation, connection with friends, and
promotion of artists they admire.14 4 A clutter of unintended
passive sharing interferes with all of these goals. Increasingly
we all cultivate our own online reputation.145 It could be as
simple as limiting the sorts of things we post on Twitter or
crafting a perfect home page. Adding noise to that signal
threatens the reputation and influence each person has
established.
Second, an increase in quantity exacerbates this quality
problem. As discussed above, businesses support frictionless
sharing because it results in more messages, and thus drives
more traffic and raises more revenue.14 6 But this only works in
the short term. Consumer attention is finite and efforts to
attract it are a new competitive necessity. 14 7 As everyone sees
144 See notes 64-68 and accompanying
text.
145 See generally Daniel J. Lair, et al, Marketization and
the Recasting of the

Professional Self: The Rhetoric and Ethics of PersonalBranding, 18 Mgmt Comm Q 307
(2005), online at http://mcq.sagepub.com/content/18/3/307.abstract (visited Sept 15,
2013) (discussing broadly personal branding); Megan Marrs, The First Step to Building
Your Personal Brand, Forbeswoman
(Forbes Feb 2,
2012),
online
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dailymuse/2012/02/14/the-first-step-to-building-yourpersonal-brand/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) (providing a guide to develop one's personal
brand); Laura Perez, Finding Your Inner Personal Brand (Social Media Today Aug 17,
2012), online at http: /socialmediatoday.com/lauraaprez/695316/starting-facebook-smallbusiness (visited Sept 15, 2013) (same).
146 See notes 99-106 and accompanying
text.
14
See Richard A. Lanham, The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the
Age of Information 7 (Chicago 2006) ("What then is the new scarcity that economics
seeks to describe? It can only be the human attention needed to make sense of
information."); Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 Temple L Rev
67, 82-84 (2008) (discussing efforts of artists and creators to seize attention in the new
economy); Pasquale, 60 Vand L Rev at 173-74 (cited in note 87) ("In an era of
information overload, attention, not information, is the more pressingly scarce
commodity.").
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more and more messages about friends' purchasing choices or
media consumption-and especially as the relevance and
accuracy of those messages declines-they lose their utility. If
frictionless sharing unleashes too many meaningless messages,
it will end in "spammification."148 Some intellectual property
and privacy scholars have used environmental metaphors to
describe the information landscape, and frictionless sharing fits
that frame nicely. 149 Consumer attention is a finite and fragile
resource, and excessive exploitation will deplete it. By
increasing search costs rather than reducing them, an overload
of unhelpful social messages will pollute the recommendation
ecosystem that represents one of the important broad societal
benefits of sharing.15 0
To sum up, frictionless sharing threatens to kill the goose
that laid the golden egg. If greed drives platforms to maximize
potential gains by promoting social information flows to the
maximum possible extent, they will destroy what is special and
effective about them. If these types of messages from friends
become just another form of advertising clutter, they will no
longer deliver most of the benefits catalogued in Part II.
Importantly, however, existing companies have very little
incentive to be judicious and conserve the valuable resource of
consumer attention for the future. As explained in Part V, this
may justify regulatory intervention.
Before turning to this analysis, however, Part IV considers
the rhetoric of frictionless sharing against the backdrop of the
potential benefits and costs we have seen. The terminology
profoundly shapes thinking about interface design and legal
rules in ways that do not necessarily match the pros and cons
discussed thus far.
IV. THE RHETORIC OF FRICTIONLESS SHARING
The metaphor of "frictionless sharing" represents an
ingenious rhetorical move. It is no surprise that intermediaries

See McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1129-30 (cited in note 13).
us See, for example, James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 Duke L J 87, 108-12 (1997); Dennis D. Hirsch,
Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from
Environmental Law, 41 Ga L Rev 1, 23-30 (2006); Pasquale, 60 Vand L Rev 133 at 16371 (cited in note 87).
'50 See notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
148
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eager for more disclosures have chosen a catch phrase that
valorizes their position. These days, supporters of frictionless
sharing rarely use its older name of "passive sharing."1 5 1 I
believe the shift is quite intentional. Of course, "sharing" sounds
desirable. By depicting anything that impedes this sharing as
"friction," the new catchphrase implicitly frames the natural
status quo as one in which individuals reveal abundant
information unless some malevolent outside force interferes. At
first glance, a "frictionless" process sounds wonderful. It
eliminates a nuisance. It frees everyone to share.
This techno-libertarian posture appears constantly in
debates about privacy. As Julie Cohen summarizes it, the
narrative assumes that disclosure and analysis of ever more
information inevitably leads to various benefits, and particularly
to greater truth. 152 The corollary, which Cohen calls the
"Luddism Proviso," stipulates that "pre-determined limits on
information processing are a manifestation of irrationality, and
those who endorse them are fundamentally antiprogress."153
Proponents of amending the VPPA relied upon this playbook
when they argued that the original statute inhibited "choice." 154
Individuals are not passive in this construct-they are free.
This Part grapples with the rhetoric of frictionless sharing.
At one level, this might seem like a mere semantic exercise,
since arguably everyone understands what people at Facebook
or Netflix mean by the term. I think that the examination is
worthwhile nonetheless. The language and the attitude it
embodies are pervasive but invisible. Although the metaphors
embedded in "frictionless sharing" initially seem powerful, they
collapse into incoherence on close examination. Once analyzed,

' For early uses of the "passive sharing" language by its supporters, see, for
example, Ylan Q. Mui, In Shoppers' Web Networks, Privacy Has No Price Tag,
Washington Post Technology (Washington Post May 22, 2010), online at http://www.
(visited
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/21/AR2010052104951.html
Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Blippy cofounder using term); Michael Arrington, Google's Joe
Kraus Discusses the Social Web At Supernova Conference (Techcrunch June 16, 2008),
online
at
http://techcrunch.com/2008/06/16/googles-joe-kraus-speaks-at-supernovaconference/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) (quoting Google executive using the term).
152 Cohen, Configuringthe Networked Self at 248-52 (cited in note 119).
153 Id at 249.
15 See, for example, Wolf Testimony at *2-3 (cited in note 54) (arguing that
application of VPPA to online setting "can be read to frustrate the choice of consumers
who want to authorize the disclosure on an ongoing basis of the streaming movies they
watch online").
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"frictionless sharing" reveals itself as a comically inapt pairing.
In several important respects, the phenomenon is neither
frictionless nor sharing.
A.

Friction

The "frictionless sharing" metaphor misrepresents the
character of friction. Even setting that error aside, the term
inaccurately describes, in two fundamental respects, the sort of
interface Netflix wanted to deploy.
A truly frictionless world would be a nightmarish place
where cars would slide off roads and we would be unable even to
pick up a laptop, much less watch a movie on one. 15 5 It's easy to
see how the word "friction" took on its pejorative flavor. In
everyday applications, mechanics and engineers frequently want
to make things move-perhaps to help gears to turn or wheels to
roll down tracks. In these situations, they use techniques from
leverage to lubrication to reduce friction. 156 Probably because
they frequently fight against it, in ordinary language, friction
took on a negative connotation. Friction became synonymous
with strife or discord within relationships of all kinds.157
Economists refer to many additional costs that encumber
efficient transactions as friction. 168 The word also entered the
slang of Silicon Valley, business management, and how-to books,
where it can describe any sort of irritating obstacle.1 59 In
155 See Robert P. Bauman, Friction, in Robert P. Bauman, ed, 2 Macmillan
Encyclopedia of Physics 631, 632 (Simon & Schuster Macmillan 1996) ("[W]e could not
walk and a car or bicycle could not move without friction; but neither we nor the vehicles
could stop without friction."); McGrath, Frictionat 265 (cited in note 1) ("Without friction
we could not walk, play a violin, or pick up a glass of water.").
156 See Bauman, Friction at 632 (cited in note 155).
See, for example, Greg Miller, FBI Gets New Role in Domestic Intelligence, Wash
's
Post A4 (June 20, 2012) (explaining that a change in oversight of intelligence activities
"is intended to improve collaboration, but some officials say it has created new friction
between the FBI and CIA"); Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Sharpens Its Aim, NY Times B1
(June 25, 2012) (describing Microsoft's introduction of a tablet computer as "the most
striking evidence yet of the friction between Microsoft and its partners on the hardware
side of the PC business").
158 For example, the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics went to three economists who
identified "frictions" that prevent buyers and sellers (or employers and job applicants)
from locating one another. See The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Nobel Prizes,
Nobelprize.org Press Release (Nobelprize.org Oct 11, 2010), online at http://www.
nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/2010/press.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
19 See, for example, Adam Pash and Gina Trapani, Lifehacker: The Guide to
Working Smarter, Faster,and Better 174 (Wiley 3d ed 2011) (describing use of keyboard
shortcuts and macros as ways to reduce friction in daily tasks); David Pogue,
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everyday language, friction may sound bad and traction good,
but both of them are similar forces in the science of tribology,
inherently neither positive nor negative. 16 0
If we pretend it gets the physics right, "frictionless" is still
misleading language for two reasons. First, even Mark
Zuckerberg does not really contemplate zero friction; Facebook
now routinely disavows its Beacon experiment, when it posted
people's activity from other sites in friends' news feeds without
any opt-in.161 Similarly, customers must first download the
Spotify app and agree to terms of service before revealing any
information about music choices. The design of Netflix Social
goes further to create some degree of friction by design; for
example, users must take an extra step to activate blanket
consent for sharing in Facebook (as opposed to sharing only
within the Netflix interface itself).162 In physics, engineers who
want to reduce friction to make something work better rarely
desire the complete elimination of all friction, which would cause
a host of other problems. The optimal amount of friction in, say,
a train track depends on how fast the train should go. Likewise,
views about the correct amount of friction attached to sharing
will vary with views about its underlying normative purposes.
And if we limit the definition of "friction" in sharing to
inherently negative obstacles, we only shift the question from
determining how much friction to deciding what qualifies as
friction-without moving any closer to an answer.
Technology does enable truly frictionless collection and
disclosure of information in many situations, but that typically
makes both consumers and policymakers uncomfortable. For
example, when the media first reported that the iPhone retained
location data in its cache, the backlash from consumers and
Technology's Friction Problem, 306 Sci Am 28 (Apr 2012) ("Friction is a hassle. Steps.
Process. And in this increasingly technified world, there is still a surprising amount of
red tape."); Scott Belsky, Why We Should Declare War On Friction (99U), online at
http://the99percent.com/articles/7015/Why-We-Should-Declare-War-On-Friction
(visited
Sept 15, 2013) (" call this stuff 'friction' - it's the tax filings, paperwork, waiting time,
protocols, forgotten passwords, span clearing, bureaucratic nonsense, big egos, and the
ever-increasing information overload that we try to digest every day. It kills us with a
thousand tiny paper cuts.").
160 See Reizo Kaneko, Yuji Enomoto, and Shigeyuki Mori, Tribology, in George L.
Trigg, et al, eds, 22 Encyclopedia of Applied Physics 283, 283 (Wiley 1998).
161See, for example, Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook
Community, The Facebook Blog (Facebook Nov 29, 2011), online at http://blog.facebook.
com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
162 See note 62 and accompanying
text.
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politicians was fierce. 163 Most actors, including the industry,
condemn spyware and other clandestine data-gathering
techniques. These are the examples of real "frictionless" sharing.
Often they are rightfully condemned as unwarranted intrusions
on privacy.
One might respond that using the word "frictionless"
instead of something more accurate like "reduced friction"
amounts to harmless puffery. Undoubtedly "frictionless" is
catchier. But it ignores the fact that zero friction would be
intolerable to most observers. Frictionless sharing depends upon
a simplistic and incorrect assumption that choices about friction
are binary-that we can have either old-fashioned burdensome
solitude or shiny new unencumbered sharing. The reality is
more complex. By pretending that friction presents an all-ornothing choice, this terminology glosses over the great flexibility
that businesses and regulators have at their disposal. We can
choose to calibrate the amount of friction at an infinite number
of levels, responsive to the costs and benefits in each situation.
While both Spotify and Netflix now engage in what they may
call frictionless sharing, in truth, both interpose some small
amount of friction and do it slightly differently from each other,
all by design.
The second inaccuracy is also important. Frictionless
sharing does not really reduce overall friction but only shifts it
from some people to others. 16 4 For Netflix to comply with the
original VPPA, users who wanted to disclose their Friday night
movie pick in Facebook would have needed to push a button to
do so. Now, with Netflix Social under the amended VPPA, those
who wish to keep that choice to themselves need to push a
button instead. The innovation of frictionless sharing inherently
introduces friction-filled privacy as its replacement. Flipping the
default also increases the total amount of information
exchanged, greatly raising the risk of spammification. By eliding
this trade-off, the rhetoric of "frictionless sharing" once again
presents disclosure as the natural and beneficial activity, the
one which should be lubricated as much as possible. In fact, the
amount of friction is a complex design choice, which inherently
helps some users and burdens others. We cannot avoid making
See Nick Bilton, Tracking File Found in iPhones, NY Times B1 (Apr 21, 2011)
(describing political, scholarly, and consumer response to discovery of location data).
164 See Richards, 101 Georgetown L J at 713 (cited in note 14).
163
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some choice, whether through code or law; there is no "natural"
state of online friction. 165 As the next section explains, however,
if we grease the skids for sharing too much, it ceases to be
sharing at all.
B.

Sharing

"Sharing" certainly sounds like a positive word. We tend to
like people who share our tastes or values, and we may then
share our belongings or our feelings with them in return.
Characterizing social networking as sharing enhances its image
as an authentic, intimate, and cooperative activity. Perhaps for
this reason, the terminology of "sharing" has been a part of
Facebook from the very beginning. It has become so ingrained in
the language of the worldwide web that it is now invisible. The
word seems like the most natural way to describe any
transmission of information in social networks. Google recently
bowed to the inevitable by abandoning its efforts to brand the
"+1" button in its Google search results and renaming it a
"share" button.16 6
But crucially, the ordinary sharing activities that give the
word its positive tone are based on active choice. I may decide to
share my dessert with you. If you start taking bites of it without
my permission, you are stealing or, at the very least, displaying
poor manners. Normally you become entitled to some of my cake
only because I voluntarily grant you permission. In the context
of an intimate relationship imbued with history and mutual
understanding that permission may become more implicit, but it
develops only over time and with many opportunities for the
parties to shape those boundaries. An agreement may evolve
between sisters or roommates that they may each take a bite of
the other's cake, or borrow the other's clothes, without asking.
But corporate entities like Facebook and Netflix can hardly

See Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 31-37 (Basic Books 2006).
166 This mechanism allows users of the Google+ social network to distribute links
from within search results to the feeds of Google+ friends. It is not frictionless sharing,
however-users are presented with a dialog box where they must authorize the
publication of the link and can add comments and control recipients. See Mike Flacy,
Google replaces the +1 button with a Google+ share link in search listings (Digital Trends
July 19, 2012), online at http:lwww.digitaltrends.com/social-mediagoogle-replaces-the1-button-with-a-google-share-link-in-search-listings/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
165
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presume enough intimacy with their users to function in this
way.1 6 7
We "share" our ideas and opinions, like we share a piece of
cake, on purpose. I have argued in the past that such disclosures
within social networks should require "genuine consent"-an
intentional rather than an accidental approval by the
individual.168 Anything less cannot be described as "sharing" in
any meaningful sense. It does not enjoy the purposefulness
granted either by explicit permission or by the evolution of
implicit understanding between intimates.
For that reason, as noted earlier, "frictionless sharing" is an
oxymoron. By conceiving of personal control as mere friction to
be worked around, the phrase removes an essential ingredient of
the sharing recipe. It perverts the core meaning of the word. It
turns a volitional and even noble act into an accidental
byproduct of going about our business.
More subtly, "sharing" buttresses the position noted before,
that constant disclosure of information is the natural and
desirable state of being. Who doesn't want to share? Cranky
toddlers and greedy misers. If the stream of information sent
through social networks is sharing, then refusing to send that
information is its opposite, and no one wants to oppose sharing.
Those who do will be branded by Cohen's Luddism Proviso. Once
again, language frames the debate, and portrays friction-that
is, privacy, choice, and control-as an obstruction to inherently
virtuous activity.
To demonstrate how much work the "sharing" does in
"frictionless sharing," imagine substituting another word and
note how it changes the rhetoric entirely. Frictionless talking
does not call up the same positive associations. We have all been
in committee meetings with people who have conquered the
friction impeding their speech, and the result was rarely good.
Similarly, digitally enabled frictionless copying results in
intellectual property infringement. The publishers and movie
studios who so support frictionless sharing prefer to call this
other phenomenon "piracy" instead. In fact, when it comes to
frictionless copying, these very same interests lobby to create
legal obstacles in place of the practical and technical difficulties
On the connection between privacy and intimate relationships, see for example,
notes 126-128.
16s
McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1158-6i (cited in note 13).
167
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that used to make duplication impractical. In other words, they
turned to law to recreate the erstwhile natural friction that
technology removed 169 -just what the original VPPA did with
Netflix.
And this brings us back to where we started: friction is only
good or bad in relation to the underlying force it acts against.
When we want something to move, we should reduce friction.
When we want to keep something still, we want more friction
(indeed, we want traction). If Netflix tells a customer's friends
what movies they watch, we have seen that the resulting
information flow is neither entirely good nor bad, but rather a
mixed bag. We want just the right amount of friction. The next
Part considers how to determine this amount and how to
develop rules that facilitate the proper calibration of friction.

V.

THE LAW OF FRICTION

Leonardo Da Vinci originally conceptualized friction, but
the French physicists Guillame Amonton and Charles-Augustin
de Coulomb later developed the ideas and expressed them as
several "laws of friction" that remain fundamentally important
today. 170 We most likely cannot match the empirical rigor or
conceptual brilliance of their scientific experimentation, but now
that we have cleared away the rhetorical haze of "frictionless
sharing," we can repeat the observations made in Parts II and
III about the forces at work. Having done so, we will be prepared
to articulate a law of friction for the world of social networks.
A.

Recap of Costs and Benefits

Part II of this Article showed that flows of personal
information through social networks, such as messages about
the movies one views on Netflix, can confer significant benefits.
A person making a disclosure engages in self-expression and
self-definition and influences others. Individuals receiving a
disclosure strengthen social bonds and gather useful advice and
recommendations. As a whole, society benefits from this

169 See, for example, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105-304, 112
Stat 2860 (1998), codified at 17 USC § 512.
170 See Kaneko, Enomoto, and Mori, Tribology at 283-84 (cited in note 160). The two
basic laws, expressed in words rather than mathematically, state that "frictional force is
proportional to load and independent of the area of the sliding surfaces." Id at 283.
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exchange, not only because people have fun and foster
relationships, but because it improves the information available
about all kinds of goods and services. This increased knowledge
enhances competition and improves the availability of many
products, particularly cultural works. Finally, intermediaries
promote themselves and draw customers through all of this
peer-to-peer activity.
Part III of this Article identified potential negative
consequences of poorly designed frictionless sharing. First,
resulting
information
flows,
particularly
unanticipated
misclosures, can invade privacy. At a minimum, they can be
intensely embarrassing, especially given that they are directed
within a person's social network where that harm will probably
be more acute. When the messages concern someone's reading,
viewing, and listening habits, they also undermine the
intellectual privacy needed to explore new ideas. Second,
inaccuracy and excess of information threaten to squander the
benefits of social sharing, potentially destroying the
recommendation ecosystem through spammification.
Returning to the three beneficiaries of authentic sharing
identified in Part II-me (the discloser), us (the recipients,
individually and in the aggregate), and them (intermediaries
like Facebook)-to what extent is each harmed by the problems
that frictionless sharing can cause? This chart very briefly
summarizes the answer to that question:
Table 1: Costs of Frictionless Sharing

Social

Intellectual

Information

Privacy

Privacy

Quality

ME
(The Discloser)

Yes

Yes

Somewhat,
because it can
undermine
personal
influence

(Recipients and

No

Somewhat,
because of the
resulting

Yes

chilling effect

THEM

(Intermediaries)

Not in
short
term

Not in short

Not in short

term

term
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Individuals who unintentionally reveal information bear the
brunt of the harm to social and intellectual privacy. As a society,
we also suffer a cumulative effect of dissipated intellectual
privacy. Information quality issues fall hardest on the society as
a whole because they threaten the recommendation culture.
Secondarily, spammification also harms individuals who want
their recommendations taken seriously.
Intermediaries who encourage frictionless sharing do not
feel any strong or immediate impact from either privacy or
information quality problems. Indirectly, over the long term,
they may receive indications from users unhappy with a design
that includes too little friction. But this will only occur if enough
people gain enough understanding of the information flows,
encounter enough misclosures, or detect enough decline in the
quality of the messages so that they revolt. If so, the market
might eventually discipline bad frictionless sharing design. In
that event, the design principle discussed below in Part V.B
would serve as a voluntary best practice adopted as a selfregulatory measure.
There may be shortcomings with a fully market-driven
response that waits for companies to optimize friction
voluntarily. First, how will users signal their unhappiness? It is
not realistic to expect that they will leave social media in droves.
As Facebook approaches a billion members and social
networking functionality permeates even ordinary web sites, it
is increasingly unrealistic to expect that individuals with modest
privacy concerns can abstain from participation in a ubiquitous
communications medium. Of course, they may defect from one
platform to another, as they have done in the past, 171 but
network effects impose very high switching costs. A more
targeted form of the market-adjustment argument acknowledges
that social networks may be a requirement of modern life but
suggests that individual platforms using frictionless sharing
may not. Users may penalize low-friction implementations of
social networking-joining Facebook, say, but not authorizing
frictionless sharing apps like Netflix Social. To be sure, this
degree of consumer choice (indeed, friction) at initial activation

After all, at one time MySpace seemed invincible. See Victor Keegan, Will
MySpace ever lose its monopoly? (The Guardian Feb 7, 2007), online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/feb/08/business.comment?CMP (visited Sept
15, 2013).
171
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reduces the problem. But it has least three weaknesses. First,
many of the apps are intimately tied to the operation of
Facebook, and the large social network platforms themselves are
all promoting frictionless sharing. As noted above when
describing The Washington Post Social Reader, some consumers
don't even realize they have initiated frictionless sharing. 172
Second, many of the burdens of frictionless sharing, such as the
pollution of the recommendation ecosystem, fall on society as a
whole rather than on individuals who have theoretically chosen
to participate. 173 Finally, because the market signals are delayed
and diffuse and intermediaries get so many advantages from
frictionless sharing, they may not be powerful enough to create
incentives for better design. Firms would respond only if they
became more concerned with preserving the long-term benefits
of sharing than with maximizing the short-term jolt of increased
traffic. Otherwise, a market failure may justify regulatory
pressure to calibrate friction at a socially optimal level.
As the remainder of this Part explains, there are simple
ways for intermediaries to internalize some of the costs now
imposed on me and us. Whether adopted voluntarily as a best
practice or in conjunction with regulatory requirements, the
right law of friction addresses the costs without threatening the
benefits. The next section first proposes a principle for designing
friction into interfaces and then considers the role of the
government in advancing that design.
B.

Formulating The Law of Friction

As discussed earlier, the circumstances of ordinary life used
to prevent information flows now allowed by frictionless
sharing. 174 Larry Lessig has made this key point about a law of
friction with typical clarity:
[A]s we've seen again and again, just because the law of
privacy didn't protect you it doesn't follow that you
weren't protected. Facts about you while you are in
public, even if not legally protected, are effectively

See notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
See Part III.B. Society as a whole also feels some of the harm from loss of
intellectual privacy. See notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
174 See notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
172
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protected by the high cost of gathering or using those
facts. Friction is thus privacy's best friend.'7 5
Before social media, your friends could not find out what
movies you watched in your home, and Netflix lacked an
efficient means to find out who your friends were or to tell them
about your film choices. Granted, before the invention of the
VCR, an acquaintance might spot you entering the cinema,
ascertain that you went to see Last Tango in Paris,and perhaps
even gossip to friends about it-but even then, that same
acquaintance would not know about every other movie you saw,
nor could she tell every single one of your friends from every
part of your life. Moreover, the producers of the movie or the
owners of the theater could not organize the disclosures
systematically as a way to spread your presumed endorsement
and attract your friends as customers. 7 6 Technology, and
particularly social media, permits the elimination of all these
obstacles-"friction" in the parlance of Facebook designers but,
as Lessig says, also "privacy's best friend."
Where technological developments eliminate friction, we
often have the power to replace it in other ways. Just as
engineers manipulate the amount of friction in a gear, we can
design systems to increase or reduce the impediments to
sharing. Woodrow Hartzog and Fred Stutzman have suggested
that providers can design social media interfaces to recreate
some of the practical obscurity that effectively prevented most
disclosures in the past. 7 7 They draw on a broader initiative
among some important technologists and regulators to
encourage "privacy by design." 7 8 In the case of frictionless
sharing, some platform designers have taken some similar steps;

Lessig, Code Version 2.0 at 202 (cited in note 165).
McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1110-11 (cited in note 13).
177 See Fred Stutzman and Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity by Design: An Approach to
Building Privacy into Social Media, CSCW 2012 Workshop on Reconciling Privacy with
Social Media *2-4 (Fred Stuzman 2012), online at http://fredstutzman.com/papers/
CSCW2012WStutzman.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Hartzog and Stutzman, 101
175

176

Cal L Rev at 42-51 (cited in note 25).
178 See Stutzman and Hartzog, Obscurity by Design at 1-2 (cited in note 177). The
"privacy by design" concept has been championed especially strongly by Ann Cavoukian,
the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. See generally Ann Cavoukian,
Privacy by Design (Best Practice Institute 2012), online at http://privacybydesign.cal
(visited Sept 15, 2013); Future of Privacy Forum, Privacy By Design, online at
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/privacy-by-design/ (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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not only has Facebook adjusted its rules somewhat, 179 but when
Google added the Google+ History function to its fledgling social
network, the company explicitly boasted that its design
preserved more friction than Facebook's.18 0
The best amount of friction, as noted above, lies somewhere
between too much and none.18 1 Our comparison of costs and
benefits better explains where to direct how much friction. Just
like engineers designing moving machinery can adjust angles,
add lubricant, or change surface materials, humans can control
the location and degree of friction in the architecture of social
networks. With perfect information we could plot out curves that
would pinpoint this ideal degree of friction. On such an
imaginary flawless graph, we could determine the ideal policy
with the mathematical precision of Amontons's first law of
friction. Needless to say, this is not quite possible in the less
determinate realms of human behavior. But we can establish
some fairly clear parameters based on existing information, and
the remaining gaps in our knowledge present questions for
future research by experts in relevant fields such as humancomputer interaction and for experimentation in the market by
service providers. 182 Companies routinely conduct empirical
usability studies when developing other aspects of their software
interfaces, and this type of inquiry also could be used to home in
on the precise point at which friction exceeded the amount
necessary for genuine consent.183
Based on what we now know, I would predict that the
decrease in people's willingness to share probably is not
constant-that some additional increment of friction causes a
large abrupt drop in propensity to share, even where a person
See notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
18
See Mike Elgan, Google rolls out something like Facebook's 'frictionlesssharing'but with friction!, Google Plus (Google June 30, 2012), online at https:I#plus.google.com/
+MikeElgan/posts/T9aM3gGcUR7 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
179

'81 See Part IV.A.
182
The Digital Trust Initiative, a partnership of business, advocates, and experts,
is
one ongoing effort to gather such information. The group has begun conducting
interesting empirical work to determine privacy by design best practices. See Create
with Context, Designing for Trust (Create with Context Mar 2012), online at
http: lcreatewithcontext.com/insights-digital-trust-and-privacy.php
(visited Sept 15,
2013).
153 Andrea Matwyshyn has made a similar point about the prevalence of usability
studies in the industry and the possibility of harnessing them for lawmaking purposes;
she focused more particularly on the usability of clickwrap contracts. Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 Wash U L Rev 529, 560-64 (2007).
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would otherwise choose to provide information to friends.
Perhaps that tipping point comes when notifications seeking
consent become a nuisance. For example, supporters of the
VPPA amendment raised the specter of constant pop-up
windows pestering people for authorization, perhaps recalling
the failures of Microsoft Explorer's intrusive cookie notifications
in the 1990s.184 This is not an accurate view of the original
VPPA's requirements, but it was a powerful argument because
moving beyond this convenience tipping point would indeed
interfere too much with the advantages of authentic sharing
discussed in Part II. Once people have sufficient control to
prevent problematic misclosures, any additional friction may
prevent desirable disclosures and should be avoided.
At the other extreme, United States law now allows zero
friction in most circumstances.185 The only real impediment to
Facebook Beacon under existing law was the original VPPA (in
instances where Beacon partner Blockbuster disclosed
information about customers' video choices).18 6 But, as discussed
in Part IV, mainstream companies like Facebook and Netflix
expect some amount of opt-in for sharing-they just want it
minimized. 8 7 The problems of misclosures and spammification

See Leslie Meredith and TechNewsDaily, Senators Consider Banning Automatic
"4
Media Sharing on Facebook, Sci Am *1 (Feb 12, 2012), online at http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=senators-consider-banning (visited Sept 15, 2013)
("Nagging requests for permission could overwhelm Facebook if the Senate decides all
media should be governed by the [VPPA]."); Wolf Testimony at *3 (cited in note 54)
(making similar points about repeated requests for permission).
18 In theory, the nature of the movie choices could be so private that revealing it
could violate the public disclosure of private facts tort. It is difficult to imagine
disclosures of media choices sufficiently "highly offensive" to trigger liability. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (making a person subject to liability for
giving publicity to the private life of another if "the matter publicized is of a kind that (a)
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public"). Moreover, the publication requirement in the majority of jurisdictions may
prevent the application of the tort to limited disclosures among Facebook friends. See,
for example, Bodah v Lakeville Motor Express, Inc, 663 NW2d 550, 557 (Minn 2003)
(adopting the Restatement's definition of publicity as "the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge"). See also
Strahilevitz, 72 U Chi L Rev at 945 n 88 (cited in note 88) (discussing publication
requirement); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652d cmt a (same). But see note 128 and
accompanying text (arguing that the narrower understanding of the publication
requirement embodied in the "particular public" doctrine responds to important interests
in privacy within one's social circle).
186 See McGeveran, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 1139-40 (cited in note 13).
187 See notes 161-163 and accompanying text.

15]

THE LAW OFFRIcTION

63

outlined in Part III suggest the need for significant user control
in sharing-in other words, few actors want truly frictionless
sharing even though the law permits it. So where should the line
be drawn?
The observations in this Article allow for the articulation of
a simple law of friction: It should not be easier to "share" an
action online than to do it. There will still be cases where this
rule of thumb restricts some of the benefits in Part II or fails to
resolve some of the problems found in Part III. But the
frequency of both errors, and especially the first one, should be
extremely low.
This proposal takes its cue about the degree of friction from
the architecture of systems themselves. The Netflix interface
necessarily imposes some friction on the decision to watch a
movie, not only the decision to share it. Consumers must log in
to the Netflix site or app (although they can eliminate that
friction by setting their device to remember the password or by
staying logged in permanently). They must locate the video they
want using the search box, their queue, or Netflix's
recommendations. Even someone who knows in advance that
she wants to stream the next episode of Mad Men on her
television needs at a minimum to push some buttons. If the
future brings us motion-sensing or voice-activated systems,
there will still be a moment when a viewer decides what to
watch and takes action. On Netflix's own terms, all of this is
friction. And no matter how futuristic you want to be, it is hard
to imagine the complete elimination of this friction, absent a
mind-reading Netflix implant in our brains.1 88
With that as the baseline amount of friction, now consider
how much additional friction Netflix would have needed to
comply with the original VPPA. Going back to the traditional
interface on a computer or tablet, at a minimum every viewer
clicks a "PLAY' button to start the movie. The original VPPA
required explicit consent for any disclosure of that movie
selection, but under the E-SIGN Act any digital equivalent
sufficed.189 As I suggested when testifying against the
Though it is worth noting that resident Google futurist Ray Kurzweil expects
such a scenario within several decades. See Kai Ryssdal, Interview, Google's Ray
Kurzweil on the computers that will live in our brains, Marketplace (American Public
Media May 3, 2013), online at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/googles-raykurzweil-computers-will-live-our-brains (visited Sept 15, 2013).
189 See notes 46-48 and accompanying
text.
188
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amendment, Netflix could simply have placed a "PLAY AND
SHARE" button next to every "PLAY' button.190 This
architecture would make it just as easy to share a movie choice
as to watch a movie-but not easier. That would comply with
the old VPPA and with the proposed law of friction.
Consumers would experience infinitesimal additional
friction in this architecture. The only added obstacle would be
the instant of extra thought to decide whether to push the
alternative button and publicize a particular movie choice. It is
difficult to imagine a design that placed less additional burden
on the benefits of sharing described in Part II. By comparison,
remember that the authors of the original VPPA lived in a world
where watching a movie involved a visit to a bricks-and-mortar
rental location and a wait in line to rent a physical videotapenot to mention limitations on the video store's opening hours
and available selection.19 1 That's a lot of friction. (And, as I
recall, we still considered the advent of the VCR a marvelous
convenience at the time.) Even against that much higher
baseline amount of friction, however, the original VPPA added a
written consent procedure for sharing that represented a
considerable further increase-much more than a "PLAY AND
SHARE" button.
Fittingly, the very small extra increment of friction imposed
by a "PLAY AND SHARE" button is precisely the additional
amount necessary to secure genuine consent.192 Thus it
addresses the concerns in Part III as narrowly as possible. These
problems all arise when disclosures occur without sufficient
individual control. Another beauty of the solution is its close
connection to the technology that enables frictionless sharing in
the first place. The very same technology that makes it easier to
watch movies and to share movie choices with friends also
makes genuine consent significantly easier to obtain than it was
before.
And crucially, as technology advances, the proposed law of
friction moves along with it because it is keyed to the actions
necessary to use the system, not to any external standard of
consent. Thus, the law of friction is a technology-neutral
innovation.
for
ample
room
leaves
that
principle
190

See McGeveran Testimony at *3 (cited in note 50).

1a1 See id at *2-3.
192

See note 168 and accompanying text.
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(Notwithstanding Netflix's objections, the original VPPA was a
technology-neutral principle as well, but this proposal is more
obviously so.) If Facebook or Netflix figure out ways to reduce
friction of use, they can benefit from a commensurate reduction
of friction in sharing. A comparison of both kinds of friction in
1988 and today demonstrates the difference: as online delivery
made watching movies so much easier, social networks and
instantaneous online consent made sharing easier as well.
Ultimately, however, Netflix never will figure out how to play
the right movie without asking you. It shouldn't be allowed to
tell your friends what movie you chose without asking you.
The "PLAY AND SHARE" concept would work just as well
in many other interfaces. Spotify, for example, operates in much
the same way as Netflix: a person must press a button to play a
song. Consumers could decide whether to broadcast each song
selection in their social network. An extra wrinkle appears
because Spotify and similar programs allow people to assemble
and listen to playlists of multiple songs. In theory it is possible
that someone might wish to share the first three songs in a
playlist but not the fourth. However, the friction required to ask
for permission before each song played would become a nuisance
and intrude on the benefits of social sharing. The law of friction
would not allow it to be easier to play songs than to share them,
but it need not be more difficult. Instead, users should be asked
whether to share the entire playlist at the same time they
choose to play the whole thing. That is, the request for consent
to share ought to be tied closely to the user input necessary for
ordinary functioning.
The law of friction would not address every situation.
Sometimes there is no user action comparable to pressing
"PLAY," so the requirement would have little relevance. For
example, a number of mobile apps now offer the possibility of
passively transmitting location within a social network (or to a
more limited group, such as family). 193 These apps certainly
raise privacy concerns and may contribute to information
quality problems, but they would need to be addressed with
methods other than the law of friction described here. 194 A
principle of architecture linking sharing to doing simply
See notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
As noted above, there are proposals in Congress to regulate location sharing. See
note 77 and accompanying text.
193
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provides one clear measure of an acceptable reduction of friction
that balances benefits and concerns in many typical settings.
The final issue, then, is whether this law of friction should
become a law enforced by government rather than remaining a
voluntary design guideline. As noted throughout the article,
intermediaries like Facebook and Netflix have reasons to reduce
friction as much as possible.19 5 They externalize the costs of
frictionlessness onto their customers and society at large. Even
if the market ultimately penalizes the activity it takes quite a
while. By subsuming the decision to share a movie selection
within the decision to watch the movie, Netflix will dramatically
increase the amount of information users disclose and thus
increase its own benefit.
Legal rules can impose friction, or encourage its creation, to
establish the architecture that best serves social purposes. 196 In
this way, law works through design to achieve its goals. 197
Consumer protection regulation of this sort makes particular
sense when innovations like frictionless sharing eliminate
boundaries between previously distinct spaces. 198 The FTC has
shown great interest in adopting privacy-by-design principles as
benchmarks of acceptable practices. 19 9 The agency can do some
of this under existing authority and could do more if Congress
expands its power to regulate privacy, as some have proposed. 200
In addition, the FTC today could incorporate such requirements
into the long-term negotiated consent decrees that recently have
become a new tool for the agency. 20 1
In particular, see Part II.C.
See Jay P. Kesan and Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 Harv J L & Tech 319, 325
(2005); Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 Loyola U Chi L J 1,
14 (2003); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553, 570 (1998).
197 See Lessig, Code Version 2.0 at 230 (cited in note FIX) ("We use law ...
to
encourage a certain kind of technology ... so that that technology enables individuals to
better achieve in cyberspace what they want. It is LAW helping CODE to perfect privacy
POLICY.").
198 See Palfrey and Gasser, Interop at 87 (cited in note 124).
"9 See Federal Trade Commission, ProtectingConsumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers *22-34 (Federal Trade
Commission Mar 2012), online at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (calling on companies to implement privacy-by-design principles).
195

196

20
See Ira S. Rubinstein, RegulatingPrivacy by Design, 26 Berkeley Tech L J 1409,
1446-53 (2012).
201 See Andrew Hoffman, Facebook Accedes to the FTC's Poke, Settles FTC's Charges,
Privacy Law Blog (Proskauer Dec 7, 2011), online at http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/
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Some may object that smaller architectural adjustments
already made by Facebook and Google prove that regulation,
even just encouragement of best practices, would be heavyhanded and unnecessary. Just as in the larger frame of
"frictionless sharing," there is rhetoric at work here as well.
First, if there had been no progress toward a better calibration
of friction, surely those same people would protest that changes
required by the law of friction must be too burdensome, pointing
to the lack of action as the proof that it was bad for business. In
addition, The Washington Post Social Reader and Spotify
continue to present all the concerns outlined in Part III, even
after Facebook's modest adjustments. We should measure the
right increment of friction against the optimal balance of costs
and benefits, rather than comparing it to whatever balance
Facebook chose to strike the month before. Relatedly, some may
suggest that regulators should leave "choice" to individuals who
can elect not to use a frictionless sharing platform. But this
argument echoes some of the fallacies in the rhetoric of
frictionless sharing. Placing the burden on individuals to opt out
of social media based on their (implicitly unreasonable)
preferences simply recasts Cohen's Luddism Proviso. 202
By requiring that it be no easier to share an action than to
do it, the FTC would establish a flexible but firm baseline for
consumer friction. This strategy taps into the popular idea of
regulatory "nudges"; the FTC sets parameters but leaves the
particular implementation to the companies themselves, and the
resulting architecture channels consumers toward more
affirmative decisionmaking without undoing the benefits of
sharing. 203 Best practices about the implementation of the law of
friction would emerge as companies experimented, whether they
adopted my example of a "PLAY AND SHARE" button or found
other solutions.
To be sure, any FTC action envisioned here would be
modest, cooperative, and flexible. It would nevertheless provide
significant protection against misclosures and spammification.
2011/12/articles/ftc-enforcement/facebook-accedes-to-the-ftcs-poke-settles-ftcs-charges/
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (reporting the 2011 consent decree between Facebook and the
FTC and comparing it to a similar agreement with Google earlier in the year).
202 See notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
203 See generally Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Nudge: Improving
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale 2008) (describing the idea of using
"nudges" to encourage optimal decisionmaking).
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By tying the architecture of an online action to the architecture
of transmitting it in social networks, the law of friction ensures
authentic disclosures based on genuine consent. After we strip
away the rhetoric, that is exactly the right amount of friction for
true sharing.

